What could go wrong for the Ministry of National Defense in 2026?

Credit where it is due: as deputy prime minister and minister of national defense, Mr. Kosiniak-Kamysz, the leader of the Polish People’s Party (PSL), has settled into the role with ease and has been managing a notoriously difficult ministry with efficiency. Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz does not antagonize, has good PR instincts, and his stewardship of national defense has avoided spectacular blunders and image-damaging fiascos.

Above all, however, he can point to effectiveness. Most notably, he delivered on the promise made in 2024 to designate a partner for the “Orka” submarine program. Add to that the launch into orbit of Poland’s first military satellites and several other important initiatives.

Crucially, he has also avoided a conflict with the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, President Karol Nawrocki. At a time when tensions along the government–president axis are intensifying, this is no small achievement. Yet 2026 may prove less kind to his ministry. Below are the potential minefields he would do well to watch closely.

Great Power politics and Europe’s great malaise

• Keeping relations with the United States – and the Trump administration – on an even keel.
Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz’s biggest challenge lies on the other side of the Atlantic. While Europe looks at Russia with growing alarm, the issue appears of marginal importance in the White House. For the defense minister, this is the first major test. The burden of transatlantic relations – slightly lighter since Andrzej Duda – has been taken on by President Karol Nawrocki. Kosiniak-Kamysz visits the United States less often and lacks the kind of well-established profile Nawrocki has built there. Polish-American relations are not easy, yet they are crucial to Poland’s security. A senior figure from the governing coalition says that Mr. Kosiniak-Kamysz’s standing is largely a function of the position held by the secretary of war, Pete Hegseth, within Trump’s cabinet.
“He has decent relations with Hegseth himself, but Hegseth’s clout in Washington is weak. Let’s not kid ourselves – this is nowhere near the level of Mr. Sikorski’s contacts with Mr. Rubio,” we are told.

• Maintaining Europe’s readiness to fight.
Let’s be frank: Europe is tired of the war in Ukraine. With a president as erratic and unstable as Donald Trump, military ties with the United States hang by a thinner thread than ever before. That is why Deputy Prime Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz must rally his European counterparts. Hence the purchasing decisions taken – and taken in that particular way.

• Relations with President Nawrocki.
So far, these have been one of Mr. Kosiniak-Kamysz’s strengths. His conciliatory tone and calm demeanor gave him a solid position in dealings with the president. But Karol Nawrocki has now settled into the presidential chair and will want more. Whether the defense minister can withstand the pressure remains to be seen. What is clear is that, with relations between the Chancellery of the Prime Minister and the Presidential Palace in their current shape, pushing through certain decisions will be difficult. Which brings us to the next point.

• Reform of the Command and Control System (SKiD).
Andrzej Duda left the signing of the reform to his successor. Yet with a cold war under way between the National Security Bureau (BBN) and the Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW), there is little room for maneuver. The result will be a prolonged period of dual authority and muddled execution within the armed forces. And so, inevitably, we turn to them.

A hole in the sky. After a good year for the Navy, the Air Force may face a tougher time

Paradoxically, the biggest problems may emerge in the domain that until recently seemed the best secured: the Polish Air Force. And this is despite the undeniable achievements of the Ministry of National Defense outlined in the previous piece.

The Polish Air Force (PAF) is indeed awaiting MRTT (multi-role tanker-transport) aircraft, but beyond that the picture is far less reassuring. Poland still lacks “full-capability” airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft. Two SAAB 340 AEW platforms are a stopgap solution that does not fully meet operational needs. This is where the challenges will be greatest.

• Acquiring new multirole combat aircraft.
For now, there is no money. Full stop. And Poland’s “fangs” are… rather sparse: 47 F-16s, 12 FA-50s, and a handful of badly outdated MiGs. We are waiting for the F-35s, but there is little hope of additional combat squadrons any time soon. Especially since…

• Closing out the FA-50PL program.
It is hard to pin the blame on the defense minister here, but deliveries of the Korean-built, Polonized FA-50s – equipped with a new radar and weapons – are delayed. Perhaps the first aircraft will take to the air in 2026, but the new machines themselves will take longer to arrive. That is bad news.

• Helicopter woes.
Let’s be honest: things are grim. The Mi-24 attack helicopters are, in practice, fit for almost nothing, while Poland’s Apaches are still some way off. And the gap keeps widening. Transport helicopters (especially heavy-lift), training helicopters – even helicopters for VIP transport: quite simply, there is little left to fly. And this is something the defense minister will have to address.

• Helicopters for the Miecznik frigates.
The same story again. After bidding farewell to the Kaman SH-2G Super Seasprite helicopters previously deployed on the Oliver Hazard Perry–class frigates, no helicopters have yet been purchased for the new frigates under the Miecznik program. And there is little to suggest that 2026 will be a breakthrough year.

As in the air, so on the ground. The concerns are real – and substantial

• Air surveillance and air defense. After the command-and-control system, air surveillance and air defense are the most critical capabilities. Although they are being developed, they still fall short of what one would expect from a country in Poland’s position. The Wisła and Narew programs are moving forward – slowly, but far too slowly. The Barbara program, which envisages the acquisition of aerostats, is dragging on excessively. Again, it is hard to place the blame squarely on the minister personally, but it is reasonable to expect him to put more pressure on his own apparatus.

• Reform of the CWCR. The Central Military Recruitment Center (CWCR) is, by its very name, a curious institution. Although it has existed for only three years, the system for replenishing the armed forces is in urgent need of reform – something soldiers themselves openly acknowledge. The institution is inefficient, has failed to step into the role once played by the Military Recruitment Commands, and seems primarily concerned with keeping Excel indicators glowing green. The cost, unsurprisingly, is quality. This leads directly to the next point – one for which the Ministry of National Defense has been praised. But, as ever, the devil is in the details.

• Military training. While training programs attract many participants, including young people, they are simply insufficient. What is more, they place an additional burden on the armed forces. There are not enough personnel to conduct training properly, which – much like the recruitment of new soldiers – undermines quality. The choice, then, is stark: either a return to conscription (which the government will not agree to, though the president would likely sign such a bill), or the pretense that a week or two of exercises produces fully fledged soldiers.

Gaps are visible in the Navy as well – although it is (slightly) better than it was

• The executive contract for “Orka.” The Navy’s greatest hope – and its greatest headache. Everything that can be said about the submarine program, and about the doubts surrounding a partnership with Sweden, has already been said. What remains is to wait for the outcome of advanced negotiations with the Swedes. Even so, the signing of an executive contract may slip, as the Swedish program has roughly a million problems of its own. Poland’s Navy does not have that kind of time.

• Modernization of ORP Ślązak. Sarcastically dubbed ORP Never. And the nickname has probably never been more apt than it is now. Ślązak would, in effect, have to be rebuilt from scratch – with a new propulsion system, new armament, and more. There is no money for that. As a result, there will be little more than cosmetic maneuvers around the vessel, while the real modernization of this corvette–patrol-ship–whatever-it-is into a fully-fledged combat vessel remains stalled.

• Completion of the modernization of small missile boats. A chronic, lingering condition. No end is in sight, and it is hard to expect that the three Orkan-class vessels operated by the Navy will leave the Naval Shipyard in Gdynia in 2026, where they are undergoing modifications focused mainly on replacing their propulsion systems. Meanwhile, the Baltic is becoming ever more dangerous.

• Uncertain prospects for the Secure Baltic Act and the “Ratownik.” The former is the government’s plan – in the form of draft legislation – to strengthen the security of the Baltic Sea. It envisages, among other things, new standards and rules of engagement for the protection of critical infrastructure. A presidential veto hangs in the air, as sailors themselves say the plan is undercooked and likely to meet opposition from Karol Nawrocki. The fate of the rescue vessel, meanwhile, depends on funding – which is currently lacking, unless the European Commission agrees to finance it under the SAFE program.

Medical bottleneck, industrial strains, and training shortfalls

• Military Medical Academy. We have written many times in XYZ about the collapse of medical care in the armed forces. So, briefly: the command of the Military Medical Component, headed by Col. Kiszka, is a hollow shell. The plans to revive the Military Medical Academy are no better. There are neither people nor money. Neither incantations nor yet another conference claiming otherwise will change that, say insiders.

• Orders for additional Borsuk and Rosomak vehicles. Maybe they will come, maybe they won’t – depending on whether funding can be secured. The situation at Jelcz facility is also problematic. One of the largest companies in the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) faces efficiency issues that could explode in PGZ’s face in the coming year. Delays, according to people close to the industry, are enormous. Yet the Jelcz chassis are supposed to underpin Narew and Homar launchers, military communications hubs, logistics, and God knows what else. The bottleneck is tightening. Managing relations with industry will be a major headache for the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of State Assets, and the armed forces in 2026. And queued up next is the Ministry of Finance.

Foreign procurement, “Gear,” and the army still at the border

• Change in the foreign procurement system. So far – a failure, mostly of the previous minister, though Mr. Kosiniak-Kamysz contributed as well by approving the plan to purchase 96 Apache helicopters. We are already spending enormous sums, and even larger amounts will flow over the coming decades, yet we buy off-the-shelf equipment – often receiving scraps instead of offsets, technology transfers, or true, partnership-style cooperation. As the Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Wiesław Kukuła, likes to say, “security has no price.”

• Operation “Gear.” (szpej). The military yeti. Hundreds of articles have been written, conferences held, discussion panels convened, and soldiers have heard the sweetest promises. Yet the program remains in its infancy. Orders for new uniforms and equipment trickle rather than flow. The reason? The same as in several cases above -   budgetary shortfalls.

• Construction investments. A pet project of the Ministry of National Defense, alongside procurement and training. Military infrastructure is expanding as new equipment – tanks, self-propelled howitzers, aircraft, helicopters, ammunition, and more – is being acquired. Yet many projects will not be “delivered” on time. Examples include the large technical equipment park for the 18th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, ammunition bunkers and hangars, additional infrastructure for the tank battalion, and ammunition shelters -among others.

• Withdrawal of the army from the Belarusian border. Not on the horizon at all. A full Polish Army division – the 16^th – is stationed along the Polish-Belarusian border. And the soldiers are not there for border protection, but for defense. Technically similar, but not the same. Border protection should be the task of the Border Guard, the police, or – supportively – the Military Police. Yet these forces are even more understaffed than the armed forces.

No easy path ahead

From any angle, the Ministry of National Defense faces a tough year ahead. Add to that the uncertain situation in Ukraine, and it becomes clear that Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz confronts a daunting array of challenges. The minister will need to tread like on a minefield, balancing the influence and interests of multiple pressure groups – while exercising caution himself.

The greatest concern is the international situation, where developments can shift as unpredictably as jumps and spins in figure skating. Meanwhile, the army remains wedded to its classic triad: “continuity–patience–tradition.” In this case, however, that is far from an advantage.

Key Takeaways

1. Mr. Kosiniak-Kamysz’s (Minister of National Defense, Deputy PM) position within the coalition is strong, and no major shocks are expected. According to one government insider, the defense minister enjoys the support and trust of the prime minister and serves as a “stabilizer” within an otherwise fragile ruling coalition.
2. The Ministry of Defense faces a difficult year. Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz confronts a series of challenges, primarily related to cooperation—both transatlantic, with the United States, and domestic, with the president and the National Security Bureau.
3. For the army, the most critical areas are command systems, air defense, reconnaissance, logistics, and the quality and quantity of training. Each of these contains significant gaps that the defense minister will need to address.