This article is a part of Poland Unpacked. Weekly intelligence for decision-makers
It is no secret that Poland’s political class is most comfortable dealing with domestic issues. At the same time, it is equally obvious that the key processes shaping Poland’s security unfold beyond its borders. For years, we have been accustomed to tensions in the east; what is new are events playing out in the Western Hemisphere.
Their catalyst was U.S. President Donald Trump, who–invoking his own version of the Monroe Doctrine, dubbed by commentators the “Donroe Doctrine”–decided on a direct intervention in Venezuela. American forces quickly took control of the situation. President Nicolás Maduro was detained and transported to New York, where he is to stand trial. For now, it remains unclear what course the U.S. administration’s policy toward Venezuela will take next.
That is not the end of the story. In mid-January, public attention was also drawn to Donald Trump’s remarks about Greenland. The U.S. president openly stated that the island–belonging to Denmark, a NATO member–should come under American control. In his narrative, this is a matter of security: if the United States does not act, Russia or China will.
These declarations sparked a wave of commentary across Europe, but political reactions remained muted. There were verbal protests, yet neither the European Commission nor EU leaders opted for tangible action against the United States. In Poland, too, the tone was restrained–dominated by calls for allied unity and caution in passing judgment.
Greenland as a rhetorical problem for Law and Justice
Amid the rapid pace of recent events, Polish politicians have been navigating somewhat uncertainly and–unsurprisingly–reaching for familiar patterns. This is particularly evident among politicians from Law and Justice (PiS), who for years consistently cultivated a narrative of close alliance with Donald Trump. That very line is now proving problematic. But let us proceed step by step.
On Wednesday, January 13th, students at the Warsaw School of Economics organized an open meeting with Mateusz Morawiecki. The former prime minister spoke more about the economy, development, and geopolitics than about day-to-day domestic politics. During the discussion, however, a question arose about his view on Donald Trump’s announcements regarding Greenland.
Morawiecki clearly tried to strike a balance between loyalty to the former U.S. president and criticism of actions that violate international law vis-à-vis an allied state. Ultimately, however, he said that although he was “not an Inuk, he would rather live under American than Danish rule.”
The irony is that on the very same day, Greenland’s prime minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, said precisely the opposite in Copenhagen. “If we have to choose between the United States and Denmark, we prefer to remain part of the Kingdom of Denmark,” he declared.
A pro-American but diplomatic president
President Karol Nawrocki, asked to assess U.S. actions toward Greenland, refrained from taking a clear-cut position.
“I hope this matter will be resolved through diplomacy between the U.S. president and the prime minister of Denmark. If we look at Greenland from a geopolitical and strategic perspective, and take into account the threat from Russia and economic rivalry with China, it is clear that this is an area of great importance. This is a topic that requires in-depth discussion within the framework of partnership. I hope further talks will move in that direction,” the president said.
An even more enigmatic comment was posted by Law and Justice (PiS) MP Paweł Jabłoński. He suggested that Greenlanders have the right to self-determination, without directly addressing the question of potential U.S. actions.
For politicians on the right, who for years have staked their foreign policy on a close alliance with the United States and with Donald Trump personally, the Greenland issue is proving awkward. The dispute concerns relations between NATO member states–an organization whose importance to Poland’s security PiS politicians consistently emphasize. As a result, while their statements remain clearly pro-American, they are no longer as unequivocal as in other cases.
This stands in stark contrast to reactions following the U.S. intervention in Venezuela.
Post-Venezuela triumphalism on the right
In early January, PiS politicians made no secret of their support for Donald Trump’s actions in South America. They stressed that Nicolás Maduro’s regime had to be overthrown and that the U.S. intervention was both necessary and effective.
Przemysław Czarnek described Maduro as a “drug cartel kingpin.” He expressed hope that U.S. actions would lead to an improvement in the lives of Venezuelans through the country’s democratization. In his remarks, he also referred to a conversation with the leader of Venezuela’s opposition and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, María Corina Machado.
For now, however, there is little evidence of any concrete preparations for Venezuela’s democratization, and the existing opposition has not moved any closer to taking power.
Mariusz Kamiński of Law and Justice (PiS), a former coordinator of the special services, went much further in his assessment. On X, he compared Donald Tusk to a dictator–implicitly Nicolás Maduro.
Government dilemmas: how to distance oneself from Trump–without going too far
Sentiment within the governing camp is different. After the U.S. intervention in Venezuela, Prime Minister Donald Tusk initially reacted cautiously. He later pointed to the irony of a situation in which Russia condemns armed intervention in another country. Ultimately, he tied the Venezuelan issue to domestic politics, responding to posts by Mariusz Kamiński and Tomasz Sakiewicz, who had called for the overthrow of the “Tusk regime.”
A more caustic tone was adopted by Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, though his criticism was aimed primarily at the domestic right. At the same time, Sikorski–like the prime minister–stopped short of explicitly condemning U.S. actions as a violation of international law. In this sense, despite differences in tone, the positions of the government and PiS converged.
A few days later, however, both the prime minister and the foreign minister showed greater assertiveness toward Washington. Both shared a joint statement by EU leaders unequivocally supporting the exclusive right of Denmark and Greenland to decide the island’s future.
“An action without sense”: the dispute over sending troops
The government, in fact, has a clear problem with the idea of deploying troops to Greenland. The central objection is that the planned mission–although initiated by EU member states–would not operate under the auspices of any formal international structure: neither the United Nations, nor the European Union, nor, all the more so, NATO.
“This is an action without sense. Either we have a NATO mission, with U.S. participation, or it has neither political nor military justification,” one member of the government told us.
When it is pointed out that Germany and France appear to take a different view, the response is curt.
“Do they border Russia? Do they need the United States the way we do? Are they going to fight the Americans in Greenland?” our interlocutor adds.
Asked whether this amounts to political freelancing by Berlin and Paris, the answer is brief: “To some extent, yes.”
The row may strengthen the defense minister
The decision not to deploy Polish troops to Greenland could strengthen the position of Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. The head of the Ministry of National Defense (MON) has spoken cautiously in public, stressing that “the unity of NATO and the West is paramount.”
“Poland wants to preserve that unity and safeguard what is crucial to our collective security,” he said in an interview with the Polish Press Agency (PAP).
Unofficially, however, we hear that this was a deliberate and well-considered decision by the defense minister. He did not want to involve Poland in an improvised “Greenland coalition.” Defense matters fall within his remit, even though he formally shares responsibility with the president.
Behind the scenes, it is also said that Kosiniak-Kamysz is sending a signal to Washington, demonstrating his agency within the government–while at the same time strengthening his own political standing.
“Donald Tusk is aware that there is little room for maneuver in this area. His international position is weaker today. Convincing Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz to send troops might simply not have been possible,” a source at the Ministry of National Defense tells us.
A political puzzle around the defense ministry
Against this backdrop, an additional context has emerged. A few days ago, Radio ZET reported that the military division of the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor’s Office is reviewing a notification concerning parts of the arms contracts concluded by the Armaments Agency.
Some of these contracts were signed during Kosiniak-Kamysz’s tenure. Responsibility for military modernization lies with his deputy, Paweł Bejda of the Polish People’s Party (PSL)–a politician who has so far operated largely in the shadows, but who holds a strong position within the coalition.
In government circles, there is no shortage of opinions that the entire situation can be read as part of a political game. One interlocutor describes Kosiniak-Kamysz as a “stabilizer” of the coalition–and it is precisely this stability that is of critical importance to the government today.
It should be noted fairly, however, that as a result of Kosiniak-Kamysz’s decision, Poland was not subjected to punitive tariffs. This, in turn, strengthens the position of Polish exports on the U.S. market. In this context, the defense minister’s actions may deliver tangible economic benefits. What is more, Kosiniak-Kamysz may count on rather unexpected support. The entire dynamic is playing out within a political triangle whose vertices are the Ministry of National Defense, the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, and the Chancellery of the President.
As one influential politician from Civic Platform tells us, sending troops to Greenland simply does not fit into Kosiniak-Kamysz’s current political calculus. He does not want to damage relations either with the U.S. administration or with Karol Nawrocki. The latter, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, would in any case have to give his consent to the participation of Polish troops in such an operation. It is clear that the defense minister is seeking to maintain correct relations with the president–a stance that also has political justification given the Polish People’s Party’s weak polling numbers.
At the same time, as we hear at the MON (Ministry of National Defense), other countries – especially from the Baltic Sea region – that may be subject to sanctions are analyzing the possibility of relocating parts of their production to Poland. Not insignificantly, the new strategy for the Baltic Sea basin proposed by Mr. Kosiniak-Kamysz – envisaging the creation of an economic and defense macro-region centered on Poland–is beginning to take on very concrete shape.
It is no coincidence that references to Greenland are conspicuously absent from the defense minister’s official X account. Instead, it features information about meetings with his Lithuanian counterpart on the Eastern Shield and the Baltic Defense Line. As the saying goes: coincidence? Hardly.
A dissenting voice from Poland 2050
Among the coalition partners, a clearly different tone was struck by Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz. The minister of funds and regional policy pointed to a precedent dangerous for Poland: the violation of international law. Her remarks stood out against the backdrop of other voices from the governing camp.
For the sake of completeness, it is also worth looking at the positions taken by politicians from smaller opposition parties–both on the right and on the left of the political spectrum.
Confederation’s cautious distancing
The leader of Confederation, Sławomir Mentzen, published a post suggesting hypocrisy among some experts and politicians. In a veiled manner, he juxtaposed Russia’s aggression against Ukraine with the American intervention in Venezuela.
Krzysztof Bosak took a slightly different approach. He clearly distanced himself both from outright support for, and from condemnation of, U.S. actions. In his view, Poland should above all “start taking itself seriously.”
The Confederation is a right-wing coalition in Poland competing for the votes of right-wing voters with the mainstream right-wing Law and Justice party. The Confederation consists of the nationalist National Movement and the libertarian New Hope. The parties share a Eurosceptic, rather pro-American and strongly anti-Ukrainian stance.
Razem on the side of international law
The left-wing opposition unequivocally rejected both support for the American intervention and the regime of Nicolás Maduro. In a tone similar to that of Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Maciej Konieczny of the Razem party stressed the negative consequences that violations of international law have for Poland’s security.
A similar position was taken by Adrian Zandberg, co-chair of Razem. In a video statement, he sharply criticized both Donald Trump’s actions toward Greenland and the stance of the Polish right.
“I would like to remind all enthusiasts of this new, wonderful, imperial world–all those in love with Donald Trump–that Poland lies where it lies. If the Americans decide they can reach for other people’s territory, then in our region there is someone else who would also be happy to declare a sphere of influence. Accepting such thinking means playing the Kremlin’s game,” Adrian Zandberg said.
Razem is an opposition and anti-establishment left-wing party, which initially ran on the Left's list supporting Donald Tusk's government. In 2024, Razem moved into opposition due to what it considered to be the government's overly liberal course. Since then, Razem has accused the government of, among other things, underinvesting in healthcare and science. At the same time, Razem is a pro-European party that strongly supports an independent Ukraine. The party is also critical of the international policy of the United States.
Party interest above the national interest?
Although the international situation remains fluid, there is little indication that the main political camps will significantly revise their narratives in the near term. On the contrary, the examples cited point to the persistence of existing lines of division.
As political scientist Mateusz Zaremba of SWPS University notes, Polish politicians’ approach to international affairs is to a large extent shaped by domestic political calculations rather than by long-term reflection on the national interest.
Law and Justice traditionally anchors its foreign policy in a close alliance with the United States–particularly with Donald Trump’s camp. Civic Platform and its coalition partners do not enjoy equally close relations with Trump, but nor can they be described as openly hostile or unequivocally critical. This posture is, in fact, characteristic of most European leaders, although against this backdrop France’s president and government have recently appeared somewhat more assertive.
As a rule, however, despite growing irritation with Trump’s actions, Europe remains in the realm of declarations. Beyond verbal protests, there is little evidence of steps that would meaningfully alter the balance of power or the way in which American policy is addressed. Meanwhile, time is not on Europe’s side–especially for that part of the continent which sees threats in its neighbors and continues to view the United States, even when it violates international law, as the principal guarantor of security.
Expert's perspective
Between Washington and the domestic electorate: how Polish politicians become hostages to image in the game of alliances
Foreign policy is highly nuanced, and alliances are diverse; they continue to be underpinned by particular values. Poland is not homogeneous in this respect–but no country is. A useful illustration is the historic clash between the strategic visions of Piłsudski and Dmowski: between orientations toward Germany and the West on the one hand, and the East on the other. When conducting foreign policy, politicians must navigate the international stage carefully so as not to undermine their own credibility in the eyes of voters.
It is worth noting that successive European countries are declaring their readiness to send troops to Greenland. Poland, however, has for years remained a distinctly pro-American state–and regardless of who was in power, this tendency has been strong. Jerzy Urban accused Leszek Miller of excessive pro-Americanism; Miller and Aleksander Kwaśniewski were also criticized for the decision to send troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. In the case of Iraq, there was the famous remark by Jacques Chirac that Poland had missed an opportunity to keep quiet. The post-Solidarity right, in particular, has long harbored a strong sentiment toward Republican U.S. presidents–especially Ronald Reagan–and toward the myth of the United States as a land of freedom and prosperity.
The situation began to change with Donald Trump’s victory. From an image perspective, politicians of the Civic Coalition were burdened by their earlier, rather sharp statements about him. Regardless of their substantive merits, these comments were clear and public. I recently saw a recording of Donald Tusk suggesting that Law and Justice was hedging on this issue. In reality, PiS has always been a distinctly pro-American formation, but Tusk’s camp has never adopted an anti-American stance either. These relationships are being discussed so intensely today precisely because Trump’s presidency brought to the surface tensions and contradictions that had previously remained in the background.
