This article is a part of Poland Unpacked. Weekly intelligence for decision-makers
In Poland, the fertility crisis is widely debated. The data indeed show that the problem is becoming severe – and that it affects all advanced economies worldwide.
Falling fertility even in India, Mexico, and China
The primary metric used to measure fertility is the so-called total fertility rate (TFR). It indicates how many children, on average, a woman would have over her entire reproductive lifespan if she experienced the age-specific birth rates observed among women in a given year. In other words, we first look at how many children women give birth to, on average, in a particular year, and then use that figure to project fertility over the full reproductive period.
In advanced economies, the benchmark for maintaining generational replacement is a TFR of 2.1. In developing economies, where mortality – especially among infants and children – is higher, the required level must be correspondingly higher.
Interactive chart According to the most recent fully available data, as many as 18 of the world’s 20 largest economies recorded fertility rates below 2.1. The only two countries slightly above this threshold were Saudi Arabia (2.28) and Indonesia (2.13). Even developing economies long associated with rapid population growth in previous decades fell below the replacement level - India (1.98), Mexico (1.91), Brazil (1.62), and Turkey (1.51). Not to mention China, where the rate dropped to just 1.0 in 2023.
Among advanced economies, the highest fertility rates are found in France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, all of which post figures above 1.5. Australia, the Netherlands, and Germany also cluster around this level.
With a rate of 1.16 in 2023, Poland ranked fourth from the bottom in this comparison. Only South Korea, with an exceptionally low rate of 0.72, fared worse, followed by China and Spain (1.12).
Where could the bottom be?
Interactive chart In 2024, Poland’s total fertility rate fell even further – to just 1.1, according to data from Statistics Poland (GUS). This marks another historic low, and estimates suggest it may decline slightly again in 2025 (GUS is set to publish the figure in May this year).
The decline in fertility in Poland has been a long-term phenomenon, albeit punctuated by extended periods of stabilization. A sharp drop occurred in the 1960s, followed by relative stability until the mid-1980s. The downward trend then resumed and lasted for another 20 years, until the mid-2000s. A subsequent period of stabilization – and even modest increases – continued until 2017. Since then, fertility has been falling steadily. It is worth noting that the last time the rate exceeded 2.1 was in 1988.
EU: fertility in retreat
Interactive chart Similar trends are visible across the European Union. First, there are no EU member states with a total fertility rate above 2. Second, in nearly all countries the indicator has fallen markedly. There are, however, four exceptions. In Bulgaria – the EU’s fertility leader – the rate rose from 1.46 in 1993 to 1.81 in 2023. Romania also saw an increase, albeit more modest, from 1.43 to 1.71. Slovenia and Germany likewise recorded increases over this period.
Poland was the EU’s third-lowest country in terms of fertility, with only Malta and Spain in a worse position. Other countries with rates below 1.3 included Lithuania, Italy, Luxembourg, and Finland. The data reveal no meaningful regional differences, particularly between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe.
High fertility is virtually absent in advanced economies
The single most important factor holding fertility down is, paradoxically, economic development itself. This is clearly illustrated in the chart below, which shows a very strong correlation between the level of development – measured by GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) – and the total fertility rate.
Interactive chart Poorly developed countries, particularly in Africa, Asia, and Oceania, tend to have very high fertility rates. A total fertility rate above 3 is observed almost exclusively in countries where GDP per capita does not exceed USD 30,000. Conversely, highly developed economies typically post rates below 2.
High fertility in poorer countries stems primarily from the absence of comprehensive social security systems, especially pension schemes. Children often serve as the only form of old-age security. Infant mortality is also higher.
Among wealthy countries, only a very small group combines high income with high fertility – Kazakhstan, Israel, Oman, Guyana, and Saudi Arabia. In each case, GDP per capita exceeds USD 30,000 and the fertility rate is above 2. With the exception of Israel, all of these countries owe their wealth largely to oil revenues.
Low fertility is an exceptionally complex problem
Beyond the level of economic development, what else shapes fertility? Academic research points to a wide range of factors. These include economic ones – such as high living costs, job insecurity, and unemployment – as well as social and cultural factors, including later entry into stable relationships and delayed parenthood. Biological factors also play a role. Added to this are institutional constraints, such as limited access to nurseries and preschools, or the high cost of educating children.
There is no consensus on which of these factors is decisive. The prevailing view is rather that they interact with one another, and that fertility outcomes in any given country are the result of their combined effect.
A solution for Poland?
What, then, should Poland do to boost fertility? Given the complexity of the underlying causes, any response must be equally multi-pronged. The largest program explicitly designed to raise fertility has been the PLN 500/800+ child benefit (cash paid for every child under 18 years of age, no income criterion). In this respect, the program has failed to deliver. That does not mean it should be dismantled – doing so could even accelerate the decline, as the benefit has already become embedded in household finances. Family policy must be long-term.
Additional measures are needed. One initiative that appears to be working is the government-funded IVF support program, in place since June 2024, which has already resulted in the birth of 10,000 children. Access to nurseries and preschools is also expanding.
It may be worth considering even longer parental leave, along Scandinavian lines, while offsetting the resulting reduction in labor supply by raising the retirement age for women. Alternatively, Poland could look to Germany’s Elterngeld – a benefit that replaces income lost due to a temporary withdrawal from work following the birth of a child.
Beyond this, Poland must also adapt to lower fertility through higher productivity and immigration.
Key Takeaways
- The fertility crisis is global, not uniquely Polish. In 18 of the world’s 20 largest economies, the total fertility rate is below the generational replacement level of 2.1. The problem affects both advanced economies and many developing ones, including China, India, and Brazil. With a rate of around 1.1, Poland ranks among the countries with the lowest fertility in the world.
- Low fertility is closely linked to economic development. In wealthy countries, children no longer serve as a form of old-age security, while childbearing decisions are postponed or constrained by economic, institutional, and cultural factors. Research shows there is no single dominant driver; what matters is the interaction of multiple forces.
- There is no single fix – family policy must be long-term and multidimensional. Cash transfers alone are insufficient. What is needed are childcare services, support for working parents, health programs, and an adaptation of the economy to lower fertility through higher productivity and immigration. In practice, this points less to a rapid reversal of the trend and more to managing demographic change.