“The state industry is a holding pen for friends”: A Polish arms executive speaks out

A businessman, collector, and enthusiast of Polish firearms, Michał Lubiński is a man who decided to turn passion into something more – into a business – while also doing something tangible for Poland’s military security. He is a co-founder of the Niewiadów Group, created on the foundations of a former state-owned enterprise.

The group, which commands infrastructure and technology unique on a European scale, is currently expanding an artillery ammunition plant. The project has won the backing of the London-based fund Fidera, which has invested PLN 250 million (about EUR 58 million).

Several months ago, the Niewiadów Group merged with a company listed on NewConnect, giving rise to Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna. Now valued at approximately PLN 1.9 billion (around EUR 440 million), the company is in the process of moving to the main market of the Warsaw Stock Exchange.

Although Michał Lubiński has been active in the defense industry for more than 20 years and has delivered a number of high-profile projects, little is publicly known about him. He avoids the media, and we sought this interview for many months.

In a wide-ranging conversation, Mr. Lubiński discusses the company’s growth plans, the harsh realities of being a private entrepreneur in a state-controlled sector, as well as his own past – on the one hand, a contract to supply Black Hawk helicopters to the GROM special forces unit and cooperation with the largest companies from NATO countries; on the other, accusations of being a Russian agent and detentions by the security services.

A private entrepreneur in the hell of Poland’s defense industry. Is partnership with the state possible?

Grzegorz Nawacki, Łukasz Maziewski: What is it like to be a private entrepreneur in Poland’s defense sector?

Michał Lubiński, adviser to the management board of Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna: Extremely difficult. The sector is burdened with numerous barriers, mainly political and systemic in nature. My passion for this industry is what drives me to confront challenge after challenge, but market reality can be brutal.

The main difficulty is not a lack of technical expertise or financial backing, but the need to fight the political apparatus and the lobbying power of state-owned industry. This often forces private companies to seek customers abroad or to act as subcontractors for foreign entities. In other words, the state ends up buying Polish technical know-how – but via foreign companies.

It is akin to a private runner competing in a race against a state-sponsored athlete, but having to run with weights and into a headwind, while his rival not only wears lighter shoes but also has referees who, if needed, are willing to change the rules mid-race.

Perhaps the problem applies only to you? There are rumors surrounding you; the prosecutor’s office is conducting an investigation…

Yes, I have heard the gossip that I am a Russian agent. I have never even been to Russia, let alone feel any ideological affinity with it. My relationships with foreign partners involve Sweden, Czechia, Slovakia, the United States, and other countries – but never Russia. I have been active in this industry for more than 20 years and have been scrutinized by every conceivable security service.

The case you are referring to has not yet concluded, but I have already won two cases before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, and the Polish state paid me compensation. Our competitors spread a great deal of false information about us and about me personally. Judging by the fact that it has reached you, they are effective at it. It is deeply troubling that such methods are used in Poland to fight an “inconvenient,” yet highly effective, economic actor – and that state institutions are instrumentalized for that purpose.

We will return to your past and how you entered the defense industry, but for now let us focus on the present and the future. Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna has raised PLN 250 million (EUR 58m) from the London-based fund Fidera to build an ammunition factory. Where did this idea come from?

We decided to focus on 155 mm ammunition, the most widely used caliber within NATO. In 2022, we secured the largest contract – outside the state-owned PGZ group – for the supply of 122–152 mm ammunition to the Polish armed forces. Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the Armaments Agency (AU) conducted a semi-classified tender for the supply of combat means – in simple terms, ammunition. As Works 11, we won the largest contract for small-caliber ammunition, and as the Niewiadów Group, for the supply of large-caliber rounds.

In 2023, there was an intention to repeat this very well-run process, but a political decision led to the creation of the National Ammunition Reserve (NAR), which brought the entire process to a halt at the level of the Armament Agency (AU). The bidders had already been selected, and deliveries were scheduled to begin at the end of 2023, yet the tender was canceled. This is another example of politicians manually steering the economy.

To execute a project of this scale, we needed a strategic partner with the right size and experience. Fidera fits that profile. It is a European investment fund group managing more than EUR 7 billion. Its investors include key financial institutions from the United States, Asia, and Europe. Having such a prestigious and sizeable strategic partner – combined with access to the stock exchange – provides independence and far greater scope to deliver projects.

Without ammunition, we will not get far. Enormous needs, meager real results

How much ammunition have we purchased under the National Ammunition Reserve?

Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ) has signed a framework agreement for 1 million rounds, with an executive contract covering 283,000 rounds of ammunition, including for Krab self-propelled howitzers.

And how much should we have to feel secure?

The figure most often cited is 2–3 million rounds.

So we have roughly one-tenth of what is needed. The money is there – last year, the Sejm passed a law allocating PLN 3.5 billion (EUR 814m) to increase domestic ammunition production capacity.

Yes. In December 2024, a law to strengthen Poland’s ammunition production capacity was passed unanimously. It identified both state-owned and private entities, with the Capital Investment Fund (FIK) designated as the program’s operator. We submitted our application first, inviting the state to cooperate and declaring our willingness to relinquish part of our equity. We received a whole series of questions, which we answered – and then there was silence.

In the meantime, PGZ applied and, of course, received the funding. Other state-owned companies have come forward as well, such as Grupa Azoty, which is to produce nitrocellulose – despite never having done so before – and it has received funding. Not a single private company has received anything from FIK. How does that square with the idea of building national capacity?

We feel we are not being treated fairly by our state institutions. The question remains: why is a private entity that wants to develop 155 mm ammunition production capacity in Poland not attractive to the state? Why does the state not want to integrate such a company into the defense system?

And yet you still intend to build your own plant. What is the concept behind it?

We want to build filling capacity in cooperation with a Slovak company. We have contracted a filling line using the screw-loading method. This covers the entire process of introducing the explosive material into the shells, ensuring proper balancing, marking, and final assembly.

As a plant, we are able to do this end to end: carry out the filling process and then complete the assembly – testing each production batch for ballistic parameters. We are planning start-up in mid-September 2026, with full-scale production using explosives beginning in October. We have cooperation agreements with major players in the sector – Northrop Grumman is a good example – and in the area of 155 mm ammunition we are their key partner in Europe.

Can you really deliver, when others have not?

We have agreements in place with suppliers of fuzes, propellant charges, shells, and explosives. We have focused the development of the plant primarily on explosive prefabrication, because these capabilities develop much more slowly than shell production, which can be handled by the metalworking industry.

This involves a range of procedures – environmental approvals, permits to conduct this type of activity, and public consultations.

And Niewiadów has all of that?

Yes. We are prepared to produce the ammunition that Poland so urgently lacks. Since 2023, we have been making active efforts to be noticed – and to this day, that has not happened.

Noticed by the government?

Yes. For the first time, on February 20, 2024, we submitted a comprehensive offer to supply ammunition, including the acquisition of a license and the localization of components. It is worth emphasizing that the first deliveries were planned for this year. The license for the original Swedish solutions was to be transferred to the Ministry of National Defense, along with the associated production rights. And the license is critical. Once we launch the first two filling lines, we will be able to produce up to 120,000 shells per year.

Many players on the field, but the contracts still go to PGZ

Is PGZ your main domestic competitor?

PGZ received its order directly. So is it really our competitor? I have my doubts. In an ideal world, Poland, as the contracting authority, would hold the production documentation and contract specific deliveries.

In August 2024, I organized a meeting at the Military Institute of Armament Technology (WITU) near Warsaw, with the participation of scientists, ballistics experts, and practitioners from Poland and across Europe who have designed this type of ammunition for major European defense groups. Representatives of PGZ and the military were also present.

As the Niewiadów Group, we proposed a complete, Polish solution, independent of external licensors. Nothing came of it. We had hoped for a discussion during the 2024 International Defense Industry Exhibition, but there was no response from the Ministry of National Defense. In December 2024, we prepared a concrete proposal to develop Polish-made projectiles and submitted it to the ministry.

Let us guess – no one responded to that either?

Of course not. And we are talking about a Polish, proprietary solution whose costs would amount to just a few million euros. Meanwhile, we hear about purchases of foreign licenses for which we will pay substantial sums, often without clarity about what exactly is being acquired.

In October, we signed an agreement with WITU, which did not wait for political decisions and developed its own 155 mm ammunition design – two types of projectiles. As Niewiadów, we signed a contract to commercialize this solution and are now on the verge of the testing phase. We have secured propellant charges, fuzes, a ballistic gun, and reference ammunition from European manufacturers, which is why we approach this project with considerable optimism.

From a business perspective, you are incurring very high costs through these investments. For whom do you intend to produce, if the Ministry of National Defense and the armed forces do not seem interested?

Thanks to our international relationships, we have a ready plan to bring the plant from start-up to full production capacity. We will either supply complete ammunition, provide filling services, or manufacture projectiles alone. Major European companies have approached us about using our production capacity.

Already today, we are a supplier of several components to European players, so these relationships are far from theoretical. We regularly send inquiries and offers to the Armament Agency (AU) and invite cooperation, including at the equity level. There is no response.

I am not counting on a sudden change in approach. For now, we are doing our work. The Ministry of National Defense does not see it today, but I do not rule out that our paths will eventually converge – because we are prepared to produce multi-caliber ammunition, including 155 mm.

So that we are on the same page: is it possible that you will sell your products, for example, to the Czechs or the Slovaks, and our Ministry of National Defense will then buy them from those countries? Or that Slovak firms will subcontract work to Niewiadów?

Yes, that is one of the realistic scenarios. We have been cooperating with Slovakia for years on projects carried out within NATO and among allied states, so there is no reason why this could not also work in Poland’s case.

That sounds like a rather irrational way for the state to operate.

We have already received questions from oversight institutions as to why no one is interested in working with us – but I cannot go into that.

A completely different scale: Niewiadów is targeting billionzloty revenues

120,000 rounds of ammunition per year. Let us translate that into figures investors can understand.

A completed round costs about PLN 30,000 (EUR 7,100) per unit – at least at PGZ, although in some years those costs are higher. Poland and other countries will, in the near term, be buying ammunition anywhere and at almost any price, because production capacity is not expanding fast enough – the United Kingdom is already directing some orders to India.

On a rough calculation, at that price and the declared production capacity, we are talking about PLN 3.6 billion in annual revenue (around EUR 830 million). For comparison, the group’s consolidated revenues for three quarters amounted to about PLN 22 million (roughly EUR 5 million). That implies a leap to an entirely different scale of operations.

We are ready for that. We have all the required concessions, licenses, and infrastructure, which we are systematically expanding. The problem is that the state does not plan procurement in advance, but instead buys ad hoc – expensively and chaotically.

Poland is something of an island on Europe’s map. The state – this is true – should own the means of production, but they should be managed in a market-oriented way. In many countries, plants are leased on a long-term basis: the state guarantees a certain volume of deliveries at an agreed price, while the remainder of output operates in a normal, competitive market. It works.

Today, Poland pays some of the highest prices for ammunition in the world — certainly within NATO

Even if we are an island, it is still possible to reach it. Grupa WB is an example, having entered missile production in cooperation with Korea. Do you have similar plans?

Yes. In cooperation with U.S. industry, we are planning the production of 2.75‑inch rockets (70 mm in Poland). This is the basic unguided rocket used by NATO helicopter platforms. It is one of several projects planned for this year; further rollouts will depend on our financial and organizational capacity. Our primary focus, however, remains artillery ammunition.

Niewiadów owns the production documentation for anti‑personnel, anti‑tank, railway, and other types of mines – historically, it was a major producer of these systems. Demand could rise sharply if Poland withdraws from the Ottawa Convention.

And once again, a state-owned rival appears – Gamrat or Belma?

Not really. They produce either components or different products altogether. And demand would be enormous – according to available information, as much as 7 million units. While 155 mm ammunition production may start toward the end of the year, in the area of mine simulators we are ready today.

We have entered the supply chains for U.S. Claymore directional mines and can deliver up to half a million complete mines per quarter. All that remains is to wait until February, when the convention expires.

Why did you decide to go public?

To raise capital. Without the stock exchange, this financing structure would not have been possible. We have several growth avenues and want to use the capital market as a genuine source of funding.

We started on NewConnect because it was faster, but we are in the process of moving to the main market. That will open us up to new investors. A stock-market listing also increases the group’s transparency and credibility.

“The previous government turned the defense industry into a parking lot for friends of friends”

Recently, in an interview with XYZ, Magdalena Sobkowiak, the government’s plenipotentiary for SAFE, said that if, at the end of this program, Poland does not have the best defense industry in Europe, it will mean that something has gone wrong. Will that happen?

If the rules governing the state-owned industry do not change, this money will be wasted. Poland’s state defense sector is effectively cut off from external competition. If that does not change, there will be no incentives for development.

How many contracts does PGZ have with NATO’s central procurement agencies, beyond supplies to its own domestic market? What share of its output does it sell abroad? There are competent people and modern equipment within the group, but political interference effectively stifles development across the board. The previous government (PiS – Law and Justice – ed.) turned the defense industry into a holding pen for “friends of friends.”

And the current government?

The current government has largely reinforced this model. Poland’s defense industry is not taken seriously abroad, because every year or so the management boards change. Under such conditions, how can anyone make decisions on large investments or multi‑year projects? No one wants to take responsibility – either they will soon be gone, or they fear being dismissed for the slightest reason. Foreign partners approach this with caution: constant turnover in management provides no guarantee of continuity in collaboration or consistency in development.

In the same interview, the minister assured that funds would be distributed roughly half to state-owned industry and half to private companies.

That sounds promising.

Do you believe her?

I assume she has good intentions.

Let me play devil’s advocate: there are voices saying that a security strategy cannot rely on supplies from private manufacturers, because they are too “volatile” as providers.

That is a smokescreen designed to protect various cliques and the interests of a closed circle. The state has such extensive oversight mechanisms that it can extract far more from private companies than from state-owned ones.

In Poland, despite the fact that state-owned plants receive funding to maintain specific capabilities – for example, the production of black powder, plastic explosives, or initiators – those capabilities simply do not exist in practice in many areas. The money has been spent. And where, in all of this, were the services responsible for security?

From scout to businessman: “It turned out I had a knack for it”

Since you mention the security services, let us turn to your past. How did you end up in the defense industry?

I am self‑taught and have a secondary education. My entry ticket into the world of defense came from my father. As a keepsake after my grandfather, a Silesian insurgent, he gave me a component from a Mauser K98 rifle. That is what drew me in.

My father was a deputy president of the former Electromechanical Industry Association. He inspected various plants, and I traveled with him. I liked it very much. Near my primary school there was a well‑known gunsmith’s workshop in Katowice. I ended up there, made contact with the gunsmith, and he began to train me in the trade. It turned out I had a knack for it.

And that was it?

Not quite. There was also scouting when I had a chance to take part in classes at what later became the Police School in Katowice. In 1991, I managed to persuade instructors, parents, and teachers to let me join the shooting section. I became absorbed in sport shooting and competed in tournaments. Eventually, through shooting sports, I traveled as a delegate to the Łucznik Arms Factory in Radom.

What year was that?

I believe it was 2001. We established contact with the management at the time, and people from Strzał (a shot) magazine – Jarosław Lewandowski and Leszek Erenfeicht -became involved. Together, we helped set up a factory‑affiliated shooting club.

I was also interested in military items as a collector. In Bytom there was an antiques market with the largest military section in Poland, and I went there often. As the former Metal Works were collapsing – and the Arms Factory was part of them – I realized that there were vast stocks of prototypes, spare parts, and specialist literature lying around. Some of it was simply being destroyed – entire shipments of production tooling were being sent to the steelworks in Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski to be melted down. Good raw material. No one cared.

The next step was a license to trade in weapons?

Yes. At the time, I was working for a Swedish group and earning a good living, so I decided to use my savings. I obtained the license in 2006, and that is how Works 11 was founded. The “11” in the oval refers to Factory No. 11 – a symbol well recognized in military circles. It was there that the best small arms in the entire Warsaw Pact were produced. Initially, the license was meant to allow the purchase of production remnants, prototypes, and key weapons components.

How did you secure your first contracts?

PHZ Bumar contacted me through the Military Property Agency (AMW). That was the first truly substantial contract – supplying magazines for AK rifles as part of the Iraq contract.

Contacts with partners in Czechia and Slovakia followed. I became a representative of several companies there, including the Czech Institute of Armaments and Ammunition in Slavičín. Acting as its representative, I concluded one of the first major contracts with MESKO in Radom – for the disposal of S‑75 Volkhov missiles.

Thanks to my involvement in practical shooting, we also managed to establish cooperation with Polish special forces units. There were several pressing needs at the time – for example, GROM was looking for a mortar compatible in caliber with NATO standards. From yet another angle, I became involved in cooperation with the Military Property Agency (AMW).

Was it a good partnership?

Over the years, two or three times we were the best customer of the Military Property Agency’s Special Trade Division. We purchased large quantities of equipment – both for various export destinations and for so‑called demilitarization, in line with U.S. standards. We cut the equipment in accordance with procedures specified by the U.S. State Department and shipped it abroad.

It is worth remembering that in those years the Military Property Agency sold weapons for next to nothing. AKM or AKMS rifles could be purchased for PLN 120–160 (EUR 29-38) per unit.

So that was the start of large‑scale business.

We did it differently from other Polish companies. Equipment offered to customers – mainly special forces – was first described in detail in the trade press. We invited clients to trade fairs, where the weapons could be seen in person.

We also invited them to live‑fire tests and dynamic demonstrations, carried out in cooperation with the Military Institute of Armament Technology.

How long did that last?

The first time representatives of the GROM unit accompanied me to an equipment presentation in Czechia was in 2008. In 2009, we organized the first such demonstrations in Poland – using the ANTOS mortar for special forces and thermobaric ammunition, which Works 11 was the first company to introduce for military use. That was how we operated until 2018–2019.

You make it sound as if building such a company was easy.

If you do what you enjoy and it is driven by passion, many things do not seem as difficult as they might otherwise appear. Although, in hindsight, I can say that there are certain directions of development I would simply abandon today. Abroad, it is much easier; in Poland, at some point we would start to be treated as competitors to state-owned plants.

And the state, as we know, does not like competition.

And that is despite the fact that we supported several projects of state-owned companies and helped them in many areas – a process that continues to this day. For example, in 2015, with very strong support from the Americans, we launched production at MESKO of ammunition for helicopter gun systems. That ammunition found buyers in Poland. And then MESKO abandoned the production.

Why was that?

I would rather not go into detail. Suffice it to say that they were producing ammunition to their own standards – older than our solutions – and in different volumes.

Some projects – such as those involving the disposal of munitions – were nevertheless completed. Then, around 2016, the Territorial Defense Forces (WOT) began to be formed, and we had products they were interested in, largely because their personnel came predominantly from special forces backgrounds.

What did you propose?

In 2017, we took part in a tender organized by the Armaments Inspectorate to supply the ultralight ANTOS mortar, which we had been delivering to airborne and special forces units since 2010. We had reached a preliminary agreement with Huta Stalowa Wola to produce a lightweight aluminum barrel, along with a technology transfer, so that it could also be used in their products. And then – through a series of actions – our production was blocked. Apparently, one of the state-owned plants that was producing 60 mm mortars at the time was very active on this issue.

That is disheartening.

It is. We were forced to take all the input material from Huta Stalowa Wola and transport it back to Czechia. In practice, this meant that in 2016 the production of ANTOS mortars consisted of manufacturing parts in Czechia, with only final assembly taking place in Poland. We wanted to develop this further, and the perfect moment would have been fulfilling an order for the Territorial Defense Forces.

Did things go better there?

We began negotiations with the Armaments Inspectorate – and they were successful. All issues were agreed. The military envisaged a three‑year delivery cycle for 2017, 2018, and 2019.

On the very last day for filing appeals, Zakłady Mechaniczne Tarnów lodged a complaint with the National Appeals Chamber (KIO), arguing that the procedure had been conducted improperly because they, too, were a mortar manufacturer. In the end, they received the contract, offering a mortar very similar to ours, with the difference that it used ammunition not compliant with the Joint Memorandum of Ballistic Understanding, to which Poland is a signatory.

It sounds like a uniquely Polish nightmare.

From 2017 onward, both I – personally, as president and owner – and the entire Works 11 company were subjected to intense surveillance. Rumors began circulating that I was a Russian agent, that I was sponsored by the Russian Federation.

This is starting to sound like a mythical “deep state.” But it must be hard to pin links on someone when they do not exist.

They say a good story contains a grain of truth. At that time, I had a joint‑venture company with the Czech firm Excalibur Army—EG Polska. In the past, the Czechs had taken over vast warehouses of spare parts for military equipment from the former GDR and from Finland. They also operated on the Russian market and in other post‑Soviet countries and held accounts with a Russian bank.

On that basis, attempts were made to “fit us with boots,” to claim that transfers from Russia were flowing to us via our Czech partner. In reality, it was exactly the opposite – we were buying goods from the Czechs. A campaign of slander followed, and I reported the matter to the prosecutor’s office.

And what came of it?

The prosecutor discontinued the case. But during the investigation, after IP addresses were checked, it emerged that the online smear campaign had been conducted from a company computer belonging to an employee of one of the state-owned plants. I was told that this person was linked to the security services and employed there as a lawyer.

GROM, helicopters, and the president

How did these attacks affect your business?

Until 2019 – with one exception – we were doubling turnover and expanding our cooperation with various partners. Today, Works 11 has commercial contacts in over 20 countries.

After the change of government in 2015, when Colonel Mariusz Pawluk took over GROM, I was asked to present the possibilities for supplying helicopters to the Air Support Team, which was to be reactivated.

It’s a story that still follows the unit today.

Initially, the plan was to acquire Little Bird helicopters. The talks were advanced enough that in March 2018 we visited – together with the unit’s command and a U.S. special operations liaison officer – the helicopter factory in Mesa, Arizona.

However, during the MSPO defense expo in 2018, representatives of Sikorsky USA – already known to us – approached us and asked whether we saw a way to deliver S‑70i Black Hawk helicopters to the Polish Armed Forces. The idea had political backing from circles close to then‑President Andrzej Duda, but there was no clear concept for how to implement it.

We therefore asked the then commander of GROM whether a change of platform – from Little Birds to Black Hawks – would be acceptable. After a moment of silence, the commander agreed, and a few days later a classified commission was established.

My role in the Black Hawk delivery was to develop a special operations training program using this platform. This included special piloting, fast‑rope techniques, and night operations. It was possible thanks to very close cooperation with GROM and contacts within the U.S. special operations aviation community, primarily pilots from the 160th SOAR.

We were also responsible for supplying 7.62 mm weapons, night‑vision devices, laser designators, sighting systems, and cockpit‑integrated weapon control systems.

It’s worth recalling that these platforms were intended for further integration of various systems. Some of them were presented by Works 11 at MSPO 2019. However, due to the scandal stirred up around the company, key elements were never introduced – among them an electronic targeting and weapon‑management system, unguided rocket launchers – and the advanced stages of the tactical training program were never continued.

For you, the contract ended with an investigation and detention by the authorities in 2019.

I think the investigation actually began much earlier – right at the moment we drew the attention of our competitors. Indeed, four days before the helicopter handover, in which we played a key role, we were detained. I was taken into custody, along with the deputy commander of the unit and my former deputy. We were charged with corruption. The allegation was that the unit’s deputy commander had purchased collectible firearms from Works 11 below internet prices. No consideration was given to the condition of the weapons or the costs of acquisition. It involved around 11 pieces, with a total price difference of a few thousand PLN. The case has still not been concluded. In the meantime, I won two cases at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, and the Polish state paid me compensation for the detention.

I assume you will now say this was a political investigation.

Of course – it was a political case, motivated by competition. Today, I have no problem saying it outright: the prosecutor’s actions were partly extralegal. It was a pretext to create a scandal and destabilize Works 11. We were allowed to complete the Black Hawk training program, and then the authorities’ actions began, which in various forms continue to this day. After my detention, I received several emails from untraceable addresses, offering a meeting to “save at least part of what remains.” I still have those emails.

Despite everything, I can say one thing: I participated in something that is rare on a global scale. Within an existing special operations unit, a fully operational Air Support Team was established. In less than 1.5 years, a small team under General Pawluk’s leadership accomplished this. It was an honor to be part of it.

Among the allegations, there was also mention of joint ski trips involving GROM personnel and Works 11.

Those trips were reported each time to the officer from the Military Counterintelligence Service assigned to the unit. The soldiers indicated their travel destination and the people they would be traveling with. These were not secret trips. Of course, there was an attempt to turn this into an allegation, but it quickly became clear that every participant paid for the trip out of their own pocket. Moreover, these trips continue to this day.

What is the current relationship between Works 11 and the Niewiadów facilities we visited?

There is no capital or organizational connection between Niewiadów Group – or any of its subsidiaries – and Works 11. In 2019, I transferred all my assets, including Works 11, to my sister, with the exception of my sole proprietorship, Works 11 Michał Lubiński. The Niewiadów Group structure contains no assets belonging to me, so the matter in question does not concern Niewiadów in any way.

So that is why we are speaking with you as a board advisor, not as president of Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna?

I hope that, despite that, a conversation with someone who has been active in the defense industry for over 20 years has been valuable to you.

Key Takeaways

1. Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna is building full ammunition production capabilities in Poland, with a particular focus on 155 mm shells. The company has a viable, scalable project supported, among others, by Fidera Fund’s investment, collaborations with foreign partners, and WITU, enabling it to produce 120,000 shells per year. This could generate revenues in the billions of zlotys. Yet, despite its potential, the company’s offer is largely ignored by the Ministry of National Defense (MON).
2. The private defense sector faces systemic discrimination from the state, which favors state-owned enterprises in access to contracts and support programs. Michał Lubiński argues that the state defense industry has become a “holding pen for the prime minister’s friends” and is no longer competitive. Both under the previous and current governments, defense contracts have routinely been awarded to politically connected insiders.
3. Mr. Lubiński contends that his experience demonstrates how the state apparatus and market competitors exploit intelligence services, investigations, and smear campaigns as tools of market strategy. In his view, these actions have a political character and aim to destabilize effective private actors, even though his company has won cases before the Strasbourg Tribunal and delivered key projects.