A government held together by prosperity, not politics

This article is a part of Poland Unpacked. Weekly intelligence for decision-makers

An intra-coalition row over Paulina Hennig-Kloska and the second personal income tax (PIT) threshold, the Ministry of the Interior’s resistance to complying with a Court of Justice of the European Union ruling, and the sluggish reckoning with the Law and Justice (PiS) years. Despite these strains, the Civic Coalition is stabilizing its support. Will the prime minister’s economic ace in the hole be enough for the final eighteen months of the term?

Recent weeks were first dominated by sensational reports from within Law and Justice predicting its imminent breakup – something that ultimately did not materialize. In their wake, day-to-day political squabbles briefly receded into the background. A popular Left MP, Łukasz Litewka, died in tragic circumstances, and the weekend closed with a spectacular charity drive led by the YouTuber Łatwogang, who raised more than PLN 280m (approximately EUR 65m) to fund the fight against childhood cancers.

Media noise and the day-to-day of politics

Amid an unusually intense news cycle, Donald Tusk and his cabinet have somewhat faded from the narrative. More caustic commentators might say – much to the government’s benefit – that, to borrow a footballing cliché, the Civic Coalition’s scoreline looks markedly better than its performance.

While political aficionados have been more absorbed by infighting on the right, that does not mean calm has prevailed on the government side. Increasingly, the coalition appears preoccupied with itself rather than with governing. Recent, albeit modest, successes – such as the amendment to the National Labor Inspectorate (PIP) law, passed despite coalition differences – have quickly been overshadowed by the next installments of intra-coalition disputes.

A row over the second tax bracket

Politicians from Poland 2050 have recently tabled a bill to raise the second personal income tax threshold. The proposal comes as no surprise. At the party’s March convention, Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz pledged to compete for the “middle-class” electorate, which is increasingly being pushed into the higher tax bracket.

The snag is that Finance Minister Andrzej Domański (Civic Coalition) was reportedly not informed about the proposal. Nor is it any secret that he would not support such a measure, given the tight state budget.

“At present, the government is not working on such a change. In the 2026 budget, the thresholds will remain unchanged,” Mr. Domański said last week.

President Karol Nawrocki sensed a political opening and voiced support for the Poland 2050 proposal. Backing from the president – and from the Confederation party – for a bill put forward by a governing coalition partner, yet opposed by the finance minister and, above all, Prime Minister Donald Tusk, inevitably heightens tensions between the head of government and the leader of Poland 2050.

A vote of no confidence as a test of unity

Tensions between Mr. Tusk and Ms. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz have only intensified in connection with a motion of no confidence in the climate minister, Paulina Hennig-Kloska. The motion was tabled by the Confederation party and is also expected to be backed by Law and Justice (PiS) MPs. In response, the prime minister has made clear that he expects all members of the governing coalition to rally behind Ms. Hennig-Kloska.

On Monday, Ms. Hennig-Kloska met with politicians from the Polish People’s Party (PSL), who pledged their support for the head of the Centre parliamentary caucus. The same day, she was also invited to meet politicians from Poland 2050. She declined. According to RMF FM, the minister feared “verbal mistreatment from former colleagues.”

There is, indeed, no certainty how Poland 2050 will act. Ms. Hennig-Kloska left the party, along with a group of activists, to join the newly formed Centre parliamentary caucus. Adding fuel to the fire, Bartosz Romowicz, an MP from Poland 2050, has stated outright that he will not back the climate minister in the confidence vote.

Mr. Hołownia: we will vote responsibly

Mr. Romowicz remains the only Poland 2050 politician to have voiced opposition to Ms. Hennig-Kloska so far. It is therefore difficult to conclude that the entire caucus will follow suit, but no formal decision from Ms. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz’s party has yet been announced. Michał Gramatyka and Maja Nowak – both deputy ministers from the party – have openly declared they will vote against the no-confidence motion. A recent post by Szymon Hołownia offers another clue, suggesting the party will vote “responsibly”.

The vote on the motion of no confidence in Ms. Hennig-Kloska is scheduled for this Thursday. A likely scenario is that Poland 2050 MPs will abstain or refrain from voting altogether, in which case Ms. Hennig-Kloska would retain her post.

Even if the storm ultimately proves to be little more than a passing shower, tensions within the coalition are set to persist in the near term – as Mr. Hołownia’s remarks illustrate. And this is just one of many challenges facing Donald Tusk.

From Tusk the Euro-enthusiast to Tusk the Euro-opportunist?

Donald Tusk’s third term as prime minister is also the one in which pro-EU and overtly Euro-enthusiastic rhetoric from the government has been at its thinnest. While neither Mr. Tusk nor the Civic Coalition comes close to striking Eurosceptic or anti-EU notes, it is equally rare to hear the prime minister call for deeper European integration or endorse every initiative put forward by the European Commission. Under Mr. Tusk, Poland has often found itself among those countries in Brussels pushing back against the Commission’s stance. That has been evident on issues such as the Green Deal, the migration pact, and more recently the EU–Mercosur agreement.

Another pebble in the EU’s shoe is the Chancellery of the Prime Minister’s clear resistance to a ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union on the transcription of marriage certificates. The Ministry of the Interior and Administration has sought to limit the impact of the judgment strictly to the case of the two men who brought the complaint against Poland over the state’s refusal to recognize their marriage.

For the more liberal segment of the government’s electorate, such actions amount to a slap in the face. Last Saturday, the first protest of this scale by equality-focused groups during the tenure of the October 15 coalition took place outside the Prime Minister’s office.

Minority rights still on the back burner

Activists accuse the government of timidity and political opportunism – especially since Civic Coalition politicians campaigned on progressive pledges and, in their “100 specifics” (distinct from those of their coalition partners), promised to introduce civil partnerships for both same-sex and opposite-sex couples.

What remains of that pledge is a bill on the “closest person”, significantly pared back from its original scope. Even this diluted proposal is unlikely to be signed by President Karol Nawrocki. Yet among the more liberal electorate there is growing criticism of what is seen as the government’s cautious approach – one marked, critics say, by a lack of political will and a tendency to hide behind an uncooperative president.

Mr. Tusk’s party is not progressive

In a poll by OGB asking, “In your view, should civil partnerships be legal?”, 53.8% of respondents answered yes. Some 36.6% disagreed, while 9.6% had no opinion. The result is striking: the share of supporters exceeds the combined average polling support for the governing parties and the Razem party. According to an April polling average compiled by ewybory.eu, that combined support stands at 49%. One might therefore venture that a segment of the right-wing electorate would not oppose the legalization of civil partnerships.

Notably, the share of opponents has declined compared with a year earlier. OGB reports that as recently as 2025, 41.78% of respondents were against legalization.

The Civic Coalition is thus showing little activity in an area backed by a majority of society – one that also featured among its “100 specifics” campaign pledges. Is this political inaction, or a calculated “call” after making cynical promises to a progressive electorate?

According to Dr. Bartosz Rydliński, a political scientist at Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Donald Tusk’s party is not a progressive force.

“The fact that Civic Platform is not a progressive party is nothing new. Recall Donald Tusk’s well-known declaration back in 2011, when he promised to address civil partnerships ‘after the election’. Little has changed in the party’s approach since then. The prime minister appears to assume that non-heteronormative voters and their allies may protest today on the streets of Warsaw, but will ultimately still vote for the Civic Coalition at the ballot box. That is an extremely risky assumption. It was, in fact, tested – and disproved – in the last presidential election and Rafał Trzaskowski’s eventual defeat,” Dr Rydliński observes.

This is not the only aspect of the government’s policy that could contribute to further demobilization of its electorate.

Waldemar Żurek: the momentum has faded

It is equally hard to point to any spectacular successes in holding predecessors to account. Waldemar Żurek, appointed as justice minister last year, began his tenure with considerable media fanfare and ambition – neither of which has stood the test of time.

Mr. Żurek now appears more focused on pursuing the head of the defunct cryptocurrency exchange Zondacrypto and fielding questions about Roman Giertych’s ties to a Russian lawyer. Such media turbulence hardly helps the justice minister press ahead with investigations into Law and Justice (PiS) politicians – once a flagship promise of the prime minister in 2023. In turn, this contributes to the erosion of part of the electorate that backed the government nearly three years ago.

What emerges most consistently from opinion polls and online debate are accusations of a lack of a clear governing vision and of the reactive nature of Mr. Tusk’s cabinet. That should not come as much of a surprise, given the prime minister’s political track record.

Dr Rydliński: Tusk has never been guided by political conviction

Asked in the past about his governing vision, Mr. Tusk famously replied that “anyone who has visions should see a doctor.” Though he no longer returns to that line, in practice he has remained faithful to that earlier credo.

Such rhetoric does not surprise Dr Rydliński.

“Donald Tusk belongs to a political generation that has never shown much in the way of ideological conviction. When he once left for Brussels, he invoked Leszek Kołakowski’s well-known essay How to Be a Conservative-Liberal Socialist? It seems to me the prime minister still adheres to that approach. Recall also his past remark: ‘let’s not do politics – let’s build stadiums and roads,’ which carried the implication that such actions are somehow not inherently political,” says Dr Bartosz Rydliński.

In the view of the UKSW political scientist, this is now compounded by a state of permanent crisis management.

“In earlier terms, when Civic Platform governed solely with the Polish People’s Party, Mr. Tusk’s task was incomparably easier. Today, he must rely on the sheer mechanics of power to navigate numerous landmines – left not only by Law and Justice but also emerging within his own camp, including from the funds minister, Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz,” the political scientist notes.

No vision – only comparisons to Magyar

Former allies, now critics of the governing camp, point to its reactivity and political cynicism as one of its key shortcomings. The Civic Coalition has abandoned much of its progressive agenda out of fear of losing more conservative voters. Nor does there appear to be any imminent shift in this approach.

Within Civic Coalition circles, the victory of Péter Magyar in Hungary has sparked a wave of enthusiasm. It has also prompted reflection that a centrist-right agenda might offer an antidote to an increasingly radical right on Poland’s political scene.

Yet drawing lessons from Hungary is far from straightforward. Mr. Magyar came to power as an opposition challenger, whereas Mr. Tusk is defending incumbency. Mr. Magyar built his campaign on the legacy of sixteen years of Fidesz rule, pointing to the Byzantine scale of corruption and the privatization of the state under Viktor Orbán – all against the backdrop of Hungary’s struggling economy and a measurable decline in living standards.

In Poland, by contrast, Mr. Tusk will face the challenge of explaining the lack of delivery on flagship electoral promises that remain important to parts of his electorate.

Voters of the Third Way and the Left on the path to demobilization

So what, then, does the governing coalition’s “state of possession” look like according to the latest surveys?

In an April poll conducted by IBRiS for Polsat, 41.1% of Poles expressed a positive assessment of the government’s performance (including 10.4% who said “definitely good” and 30.7% “rather good”). A majority – 52.6% - held a negative view (37% “definitely bad” and 15.6% “rather bad”).

More revealing are the breakdowns by electorate. Unsurprisingly, over 90% of Law and Justice (94.9%) and Confederation (91.1%) voters assess the government negatively. Yet signs of disappointment are also visible within the coalition’s own electorate.

Among Civic Coalition supporters, 12.4% rate Mr. Tusk’s cabinet negatively.

A more critical view emerges among voters of the New Left. While a majority still assess the government positively (57.1%), a sizeable minority – 36.4% - view its actions negatively.

Even more dissatisfied than satisfied is the electorate of the former Third Way alliance (Poland 2050 and the Polish People’s Party). Among them, 51.6% gave the government a negative assessment, while 42.5% expressed a positive one.

The IBRiS findings therefore point to greater skepticism among supporters of smaller coalition partners than among Civic Coalition voters themselves. Yet it is precisely their mobilization that will be crucial for any potential re-election of the October 15 coalition.

One-third of respondents satisfied with the government

Public sentiment toward the government has also been measured by CBOS. In the surveys conducted by the – ironically – government-affiliated polling institute, Mr. Tusk’s cabinet receives lower ratings than in IBRiS. Some 35% of respondents identify as supporters of the government. A slightly larger share – 39% - are its opponents, while one in five (21%) declare indifference toward it. For the government, that is the less encouraging takeaway.

The level of support recorded by CBOS broadly correlates with backing for the Civic Coalition in opinion polls. In April, the party averaged 33.8% support according to ewybory.eu. This figure closely mirrors the CBOS measure of government approval.

There is, however, also a more favorable reading. The share of positive assessments of the government in CBOS surveys has remained broadly stable for nearly two years. Month-to-month data do not suggest deterioration, let alone a collapse, in perceptions of Mr. Tusk’s cabinet. Instead, they point to stabilization – and in April, even a slight uptick in government evaluations.

It is the economy that stabilises the government’s ratings

Although elections are still a long way off, the factor most likely working in favour of the governing coalition is Poles’ assessment of their economic situation.

At the end of April, CBOS published a report on household financial conditions. It shows that the share of people declaring financial comfort is the highest in the history of the survey.

Some 39% of respondents say they live well (32%) or very well (7%). Those in the first group report having enough for everyday needs without having to save excessively, while those in the second say they can afford certain luxuries. By contrast, nearly half of respondents (49%) describe their situation as “average”: they can cover day-to-day expenses but need to save for larger purchases.

Compared with 2025, the share of those feeling financially secure has also increased slightly – from 30% to 34%. At the same time, the level of concern about falling into poverty has declined only marginally, from 24% to 23%.

In a separate survey by Social Changes for Interia news portal, respondents were asked about Poland’s most pressing problems. The top concerns were high prices of energy, electricity and gas (57%), followed closely by access to healthcare services (56%).

Wallets over ideas?

What conclusions, then, can be drawn from public opinion data for the prime minister’s camp?

The Civic Coalition’s electorate remains loyal, consistently declaring support for the government. At the same time, however, there are signs of growing dissatisfaction that could translate into demobilization among much of the former Third Way electorate and a significant share of New Left voters. The latter, with a fair degree of probability, could be partly absorbed by the opposition party Razem, which in several recent polls has crossed the electoral threshold.

The government is also likely being undermined by its limited effectiveness in holding its predecessors to account, as well as its apparent avoidance of equality-related issues. This may further demobilize – or even prompt the defection of – part of its progressive electorate, potentially toward Razem.

At the same time, a record number of Poles view their personal financial situation positively. In 2019, voters also reported satisfaction with their material conditions, which then contributed significantly to the record popularity of Law and Justice and the re-election of Mateusz Morawiecki’s government.

The question, then, is whether in 2027 Poles will again conclude that changing the government simply does not pay.

“Tusk will scare voters with the Kaczyński–Bosak–Braun trio”

“If parliamentary elections were held this Sunday, the current coalition would most likely lose its majority in the Sejm. A similar U-turn is visible on fundamental human rights issues. The government has unexpectedly opted for such radical steps as suspending the right to asylum at Poland’s border. On these matters, the Civic Platform in this term has simply deserted its positions,” says Dr Rydliński.

He offers a thought experiment in political imagination:

“Imagine that the decision to suspend the right to asylum were taken by a Law and Justice government. Donald Tusk would immediately thunder that the PiS authorities were gravely violating human rights. This illustrates the almost cynical approach of the current administration. The government closely monitors public sentiment. If a majority of Poles begin to express doubts, for example about assisting refugees from Ukraine, the prime minister immediately jumps on that bandwagon. The problem is that following polling trends is one thing; quite another is shaping a responsible policy from the position of a governing party,” the expert argues.

In the view of the UKSW political scientist, the main guiding theme until the end of the current term will be positioning against a potential right-wing coalition after 2027.

“The dominant narrative, from now until autumn next year, will be fear of a coalition between Jarosław Kaczyński, Krzysztof Bosak and Grzegorz Braun. The government’s message will be built around a single line: ‘it is difficult, we must spend billions on missiles, bombs and defense shields at the expense of healthcare and oncology, but remember – if those people return, it will be even worse.’ My assumption is that, in the long run, this may not be enough. Donald Tusk seems not to fully grasp that it was not he personally who won the election, but the broad October 15 Coalition that did,” he concludes.

“The prime minister has failed to decode the reasons he governs”

In the expert’s view, without the flow of wavering so-called “light PiS” voters toward the Third Way, Mr. Tusk would not be prime minister today.

“Those former PiS voters who backed the Third Way did not do so because they wanted to see Mr. Kaczyński or Mr. Ziobro behind bars. They did so because they expected an efficient state – something as basic as a bus service in every municipality. My impression is that the prime minister has still not fully decoded the reasons why he was able to take the helm of the current government in the first place,” Dr Rydliński concludes.

If, therefore, the prime minister succeeds in convincing both his own supporters and those of his coalition partners, then the lack of a clear governing vision, disputes with the European Commission, political opportunism, and reactive rather than agenda-setting politics would prove to be less important than maintaining a decent standard of living and instilling fear of a future ruled by a right-wing triumvirate.

It is not governing effectiveness but widespread economic optimism among citizens that is currently stabilizing the government’s ratings. Record-high assessments of personal financial conditions among Poles act as a buffer, insulating the coalition from the immediate consequences of its political and communication missteps. It remains uncertain, however, whether this strategy will be sufficient in the context of next year’s election campaign.
The October 15 coalition, instead of pursuing a coherent vision of the state, is mired in internal disputes. Divergent positions on fundamental issues such as fiscal policy and solidarity toward its own ministers expose a lack of strategic direction and the reactive nature of the cabinet. This political stagnation is fueling growing frustration among parts of the electorate and risks demobilization, particularly among voters of smaller coalition parties.
Donald Tusk’s cabinet is drifting away from its electoral promises, quietly scaling back its progressive agenda while unexpectedly adopting a more assertive stance toward EU institutions. The marginalization of liberal demands – visible in the neglect of minority rights and the sluggish approach to holding previous governments accountable – stands in contrast to a firm tone in relations with Brussels. This political opportunism and shift toward the conservative center risks increasing discontent within the left-leaning segment of the electorate and creates space for opposition parties.