Poland’s permanent campaign politics

“Tusk enjoys political maneuvering and crafting clever narratives. But when it comes to governing decisively and painstakingly reforming the structures of the state, his record is less impressive," says Łukasz Pawłowski, head of the Nationwide Research Group (Ogólnopolska Grupa Badawcza, OGB).

We discuss, among other things, the current balance of power within the governing camp and the opposition, as well as the referendum in Kraków.

Krzysztof Figlarz, XYZ: Let’s assume a general election were held next Sunday. Who would take power?

Łukasz Pawłowski, Head of the Nationwide Research Group (OGB): I don’t know. In my view, the odds are evenly balanced. If an election were held next Sunday, the parties would compete in a different configuration from the one reflected in today’s polls. Poland 2050, the Polish People’s Party (PSL), and the Razem party certainly would not run independently. The Left would either be just above the electoral threshold or below it.

Divisions on the right, consolidation in the governing camp

Today’s polling gives the right a theoretical majority because it assumes that votes on the left are fragmented. In a real election, the smaller parties would most likely have to reach an agreement among themselves to avoid being pushed out of parliament.

And if you had to predict today, based on the polling, how should the governing coalition reorganize itself to achieve the best possible outcome?

The question is: the best outcome for whom? Each party has its own interests. I see two possible paths.

The first is full consolidation around the Civic Coalition (KO) and Donald Tusk. That would be the best option for the prime minister and KO, but less attractive for the smaller parties.

The second path resembles the arrangement seen in 2023: a broad bench, separate electoral lists competing for a similar electorate, and then a merging of interests after the election. That scenario is more difficult today because the liberal camp is no longer on course to win a majority of the vote. Nawrocki won the presidential election, which suggests that the available pool of support is too small for all of these parties to enter parliament independently and on their own terms.

There is also the possibility of creating a separate electoral list alongside KO, bringing together politicians from the smaller parties, but that would be difficult as well. I do not envy them this decision. It is clear that they face a serious challenge in figuring out how to secure their place in the next parliament.

A weak government sustained by Tusk’s strength. The others are fighting among themselves

When we look at today’s pre-election landscape, it seems that KO still has not concluded that this is the moment to get moving. Confederation and Law and Justice (PiS) are touring the country and meeting voters despite their internal divisions. Razem has also been on the road. On the government side, however, there has been little real outreach to voters so far. Why is that?

First, because competition is more intense on the right. You can see it in the proliferation of parties and their internal conflicts. That political camp is in a constant state of churn. On the liberal side, meanwhile, KO’s dominance over its coalition partners is probably stronger today than at any point in its history.

Donald Tusk has never been this powerful – either within Civic Platform (PO – previous party – ed.) or, more broadly, across the liberal side of Polish politics. He holds a controlling stake. In the past, he had to take other players into account and negotiate with them. Today, he has almost everything under his control. Perhaps that is why relatively little is happening in that camp.

Moreover, the parties currently touring the country are not yet doing so with the 2027 election result in mind. It is too early for that. They are competing with one another for opposition voters. The battle is over who will emerge as the dominant force on the right. That is why the right is more interesting today – there is simply more movement. But these are, in effect, internal qualifying rounds.

For the time being, KO does not need to engage in that kind of contest. In our polling, it has consistently recorded support of 37–38% since October, pointing to a very strong position of dominance.

Why does trust in the government diverge from KO’s poll ratings?

KO (Civic Coallition) leads in the polls, yet trust in the government looks significantly weaker. It is not collapsing dramatically, but it is also not at a level that would guarantee a comfortable path to re-election. Where does this gap come from? What currently helps the government – and what could undermine it?

I am often asked: how is it possible that KO has 38% support while only around 30% of citizens express trust in the government? I usually answer with the example of the second round of the presidential election. Back then, support for the government was similar, perhaps even slightly lower than today, and yet 49% of voters cast their ballot for Rafał Trzaskowski. In other words, the government did not discourage them enough to vote differently.

The same logic applies now. Who would voters of Trzaskowski (former presidential candidate and mayor of Warsaw – ed.) support instead? They would have to choose someone from the liberal camp, and above all KO. The other coalition partners are also part of the government, so dissatisfaction is spread across the entire bloc. KO, however, remains the most distinctive actor and has the most decisive politician in the system – namely the prime minister Tusk. That is why it retains its support.

The most important factor, however, remains the economy. We often forget this because we are absorbed by parliamentary politics, security issues, image management, or minor scandals. Ultimately, people vote with their wallets and based on whether they feel their lives are getting better or worse. PiS lost power because, after inflation and the pandemic, a majority concluded that their standard of living had deteriorated.

The key question for 2027 is whether voters will feel that their lives have improved. This will be shaped by inflation, the international situation, prices, and the sense of financial security. It can either mobilize or demobilize the electorate. Since there are currently no major shifts between political camps, the decisive factor will be which side proves more effective at turning out its own voters.

The costly fuel shield keeps the government afloat

Let us return to the factors that either help or harm the government.

If we look at the polls, up until February the government’s condition did not look bad. Real wages were rising faster than inflation, so the financial situation appeared relatively optimistic. Then came international turbulence. Tensions around Iran created uncertainty on the oil market and fears of another crisis. Today, we are effectively living in limbo. The Strait of Hormuz is closed, and it is unclear how the situation will develop.

And the government is still subsidizing fuel prices.

Yes. The scale of the problem is significant, as the government is currently spending around PLN 1.5 billion per month (approximately EUR 0.35 billion) to keep fuel prices down. It is a major trap. Ending these subsidies would be perceived by many voters simply as a price hike.

There is a shortage of funds in the budget for many areas, but the government sees that the political cost of a sudden spike in fuel prices could be enormous. It is extremely difficult to unwind this policy because there is no good moment to do so. There was the May bank holiday, soon there is Corpus Christi (both dates mean ‘long weekends’ where people take one or two days off to extend a weekend and have a getaway – ed.), then the summer holidays, and after that the campaign season. When exactly should it be cut?

It costs a huge amount of money, but the government knows that fuel prices can upend the entire political table. The prime minister can hold press conferences and post provocative comments on X that appeal to the hard-core electorate. But if the price of a liter of fuel suddenly rises by PLN 2 (around EUR 0.45), everything could fall apart. That is the reality of Polish politics.

The Prime Minister adopts the right’s narrative at the expense of his own vision for Poland

In this situation, does the government still have room for proactive policymaking? Fuel subsidies are a reactive measure to crisis. The same applies to other moves: a tougher stance on migration, the expulsion of a Ukrainian influencer from Poland. Is the government not simply doing what it must, while avoiding decisions that could build its own narrative? And will voters not eventually ask: how exactly do you differ from PiS?

When analyzing government policy, one must effectively speak about Donald Tusk and his closest circle. They set the direction, while the rest of the coalition follows. The prime minister’s strategy from the outset has been clear: shift public debate – and himself – towards the right in order to deprive the right wing of its mobilization tools.

This applies to border policy, migration, Ukraine – including the case of the aforementioned influencer, as public sentiment has shifted significantly - and climate policy. Today, it is difficult for the right to engage Tusk in disputes over fundamental issues because the prime minister speaks the language of PiS from years ago. His positions are markedly different from those presented a few years ago by Rafał Trzaskowski or parts of the liberal elite, who argued at the border that people should be admitted first and verified later. Tusk has abandoned that approach – and done so effectively.

This is visible even during anti-government demonstrations. They lack energy because it is difficult to construct a simple, compelling point of conflict with Tusk.

On the other hand, for voters in this camp, the central promise remains stopping PiS and preventing its return to power. It is not about major programmatic differences. For Civic Platform voters, the division is straightforward: on one side Tusk, on the other Kaczyński (the leader of PiS – ed.). And that is often enough.

However, this is tactical thinking, pursued at the expense of a long-term vision. Donald Tusk is far more comfortable in the game of politics than in the direct management of the state.

Absolutely.

He prefers purely political maneuvering and constructing clever narratives. But when it comes to governing decisively, delivering concrete solutions to citizens on an ongoing basis, and laboriously reforming state structures, his performance is only average. This was clearly visible before the presidential campaign: there was little politics and a great deal of routine administrative management.

The post-election wave of optimism, under the slogan “there are more of us and from now on things will only get better,” quickly ran out of steam. The prime minister concluded that he had to return immediately to high politics. And that is where he excels. He has recovered from an image crisis, successfully imposed his own agenda, and – above all – deprived PiS of the energy and cohesion that could have united it. He has forced it into internal conflict. For him personally, this is a very comfortable position.

That is why I maintain the assessment that the odds remain 50–50. The point is not that Donald Tusk will present a grand vision by 2027 and that voters will endorse it. Rather, the next campaign will once again be based on fear. We will again hear calls to mobilize at the ballot box to prevent Jarosław Kaczyński, together with Braun, Mentzen, and Bosak (far right – ed.) from returning to power and taking Poland out of the European Union. It will be a hard political contest, not a competition of substantive visions and programs.

A split in PiS? It does not pay off – but politics is driven by chance

Let us turn to the right side of the political spectrum. Looking ahead to 2027 (next parliamentary elections – ed.), will Law and Justice (PiS) run in its current form, or could there be a split driven by the actions of Mateusz Morawiecki?

I am not deeply familiar with the intricacies of internal party dynamics, but I can speak about external constraints. The data clearly show that building an entirely new, separate party around Mateusz Morawiecki would make little sense today. Some 90% of its supporters would come from current PiS voters. Such a project would attract almost no new electorate. It would certainly not win over anyone from the liberal side or from the Civic Coalition’s 15 October camp (the governing coalition – ed.), because the psychological barrier there is too strong. Morawiecki was a central figure in the previous government.

Read also: Mr. Morawiecki builds position as PiS frictions deepen

In politics, however, many things are driven by emotion and personal animosity. Real-world politics – what is actually implemented, not what is planned in strategic documents over months – is often shaped by chance. I am certain that Morawiecki’s inner circle understands how limited the electoral prospects of an independent project would be. That, however, does not rule out the scenario of: “we will show Kaczyński—and we are breaking away.”

A similar issue concerns cohesion within Confederation. A split would make little strategic sense, yet political chemistry between its two factions is already virtually absent. Confederation itself is an interesting experiment: an alliance of groups that have little in common, often operating separately, with leaders who barely communicate with one another. What holds them together is the pragmatic belief that they must run on joint lists for electoral reasons. It is difficult to predict whether this arrangement will survive through the end of the campaign.

In analyses of the right, Krzysztof Bosak is rarely mentioned today, and I believe he will play a very significant role. Unlike Sławomir Mentzen or Mateusz Morawiecki, Bosak fits very well into the model of a traditional right-wing voter.

“The good grandson” versus crypto: who will capture right-wing emotions?

Is Bosak a model politician for the conservative voter?

The traditional right-wing voter is deeply rooted in the Church. Faith and patriotism are fundamental values. Bosak works well with the image of the “good grandson”: he is young in generational terms, yet still accepted by older, conservative voters. In some ways, this resembles the prime of Zbigniew Ziobro before he left PiS, when he was seen as a popular, young, and strongly religious politician.

Read also: Poland's mainstream right courts far-right fringe politician for future coalition

When Bosak talks about family, the traditional voter understands him immediately. Mentzen, by contrast, likes to talk to older audiences about cryptocurrencies, which remains incomprehensible to many of them. Bosak’s more restrained image as a stable Deputy Speaker of the Sejm adds to his credibility. In my view, in the coming political processes, he will play a significantly larger role.

Braun’s electorate in Kraków (local elections for the mayor – ed.) has disappeared…

There is also a third player on the right. What is Grzegorz Braun’s coalition potential with his former colleagues and with PiS?

Before the election, Braun will be a problem for the right. After the election, however, he could become a kingmaker – especially if his result turns out to be closer to polling figures than to actual voter mobilization.

Read also: A motley crew of extremes: Who are Grzegorz Braun’s people?

We saw an interesting phenomenon in Kraków during the exit poll research. Turnout in the referendum was highest among Confederation and PiS voters, and significantly lower among Braun’s supporters. Only four in ten of them turned out to vote.

This raises a question: is Braun’s anti-system electorate interested in local government at all? Or does its activity boil down mainly to loud declarations online?

Braun’s result may shape the future political landscape. If he achieves a strong outcome, it will be difficult to form a government without him. If, however, instead of a polling-level 10%, he receives 5–6% in the election, entirely different coalition possibilities will open up.

…but in the research it is the only pro-China electorate

A recently published OGB report on Poles’ attitudes toward the United States and China shows that it is precisely Grzegorz Braun’s electorate that often views China as a future global power with which Poland should cooperate economically and militarily. Does this mean that next year we may see a strengthening of Chinese influence in Poland and attempts to project this narrative onto broader voter groups?

I do not think so, because these sympathies are largely confined to Braun’s specific electorate. It is also a misconception that this group consists primarily of older voters. Braun’s strongest support is actually among people aged 30 to 39.

Foreign influence is already present in Poland, but it operates mostly “under the surface”: on the internet, social media, and closed platforms. The report clearly showed that the anti-system electorate – particularly susceptible to conspiracy theories – has become an effective target for Chinese narratives. We tend to focus on the threat from Russia, while in fact influence is also coming from a completely different direction.

Younger politicians are not necessarily more effective online

Which politicians are best at navigating rapidly changing digital conditions?

I would not say it is the youngest. A good example is Aleksander Miszalski’s local campaign in Kraków. A modern, almost “TikTok-style” format ended in an image failure. In politics, what matters online is not simply familiarity with tools and trends, but a feel for public sentiment.

In this respect, experienced politicians such as Donald Tusk perform very well. He regularly ranks among the leaders in terms of online reach in Poland. Younger politicians often understand platforms and algorithms, but they do not always have a sense of mass public moods.

Sławomir Mentzen performs very well in delivering digital messaging to younger audiences. However, he lacks effective channels to reach older voters, where his support remains marginal. This limits Confederation’s ability to fully capture the emotional space of the right-wing electorate.

Kraków: the collapse of the myth of negative campaigning’s effectiveness

Let us pause for a moment on Miszalski (the mayor of Kraków ousted in the referendum – ed.). He was harmed by many factors, including the online campaign. Can we conclude from this that Civic Coalition (KO) is today unprepared for digital campaigning? Or is this simply a Kraków-specific case?

This is a separate story. First, the campaign was not run by the national leadership of the Civic Platform, but by a local campaign team. Second, there was a clear lack of sensitivity to the average resident of Kraków. What passes as innovation online was rejected by a more detached urban electorate in that city.

Also read: After Kraków, a referendum domino effect?

An important lesson from Kraków is also the collapse of the myth that negative campaigning is always effective. It was assumed that in online politics one must always aggressively attack opponents. In Kraków, however, this took such a brutal form that it alienated part of the electorate and turned it against the campaign itself. Campaign teams will now have to reassess their exaggerated reliance on negative strategies.

Miszalski’s defeat has local roots, but it may trigger a wave of referendums

The right-wing narrative online strongly promotes the thesis that the Kraków defeat signals a broader series of losses for Civic Coalition (KO). Is this not an overestimation of the impact of these local elections on national politics?

These are two separate issues. First, I believe PiS will not win this election in Kraków. It has no realistic chance of prevailing in large cities today. Civic Coalition will also find it very difficult and will likely not win either. Ultimately, the office will probably go to a local candidate.

For that reason, the prime minister’s and KO’s engagement will be minimal. This is a cynical calculation: the aim is to ensure that any potential defeat of the candidate is not politically attributed to the government’s image.

As for the right-wing narrative, this is a classic political spin. Similar predictions of PiS’s decline were made when Konrad Fijołek won the mayoral election in Rzeszów in 2021. The right used that moment to portray cracks in the ruling camp, but Miszalski’s defeat has local causes. It is not a harbinger of a nationwide right-wing surge.

However, this case may trigger a wave of imitators at the local government level. Activists in cities such as Kielce, Wrocław, Rzeszów, or Lublin may attempt to organize similar referendums, seeing Kraków as a successful precedent.

We live in a permanent campaign

Will the next three summer months be the last calm period before a year-long election campaign?

Honestly, I do not feel we have had any calm period recently. We are living in a permanent campaign. Political parties constantly generate conflict, and everything remains perpetually on a knife’s edge.

We will once again hear that these are the most important elections in history and that Poland must be saved – depending on which side is speaking. We have become accustomed to this. Political polarization worldwide, as clearly visible in the United States, continues to intensify.

So during the summer, citizens rest while politicians keep fighting?

Those who want to rest will rest. For people involved in politics, August is essentially the only real vacation period. The parliamentary recess means fewer MPs in Warsaw and, consequently, fewer opportunities for sharp narratives and political clashes. It is effectively the only moment when one can take a breath.

Key Takeaways

1. According to Łukasz Pawłowski, Donald Tusk has come to dominate the liberal side of the political spectrum, weakening the opposition by adopting its rhetoric on key cultural and value-based issues. The governing camp, however, finds itself in a difficult fiscal position due to the monthly cost of fuel price subsidies. Ending this program could trigger strong public dissatisfaction and endanger the government’s electoral prospects.
2. On the right side of the political scene, constant reshuffling and growing internal divisions are underway. In the view of the head of OGB, any attempt by Mateusz Morawiecki to create a new party lacks political justification, as such a project would fail to attract a meaningful number of new voters. Within Confederation itself, Krzysztof Bosak appears to have the strongest potential to reach traditional conservative voters, thanks to his restrained image and his role as a stable figure on the right.
3. Pawłowski assesses the chances of the main political blocs in the next parliamentary election as evenly balanced. In his view, the next campaign will be driven primarily by fear of the opponent and by mobilizing voters against the other side. Success will not depend on digital tool literacy alone, but rather on the ability to accurately read and respond to genuine social moods.