This article is a part of Poland Unpacked. Weekly intelligence for decision-makers
Counter-drone defense has become one of the defining buzzwords in Poland's security debate. Protecting critical national infrastructure against unmanned aerial systems is now a prerequisite for national security. But where does Poland actually stand?
The attack of September 2025 exposed just how unprepared Poland remains for drone-related threats. In response, the Polish Air Force and allied aircraft were scrambled. Drones worth several thousand – or at most tens of thousands – of dollars were intercepted with missiles costing hundreds of thousands of dollars each. The mismatch between the scale of the threat and the cost of the response was impossible to ignore.
Explainer
The September 10 drone incident
On the night of 9–10 September 2025, around 19–21 drones — most of them Russian-made Gerbera-type decoys or attack drones, flying largely out of Belarus — crossed into Polish airspace during a massive Russian strike on Ukraine, prompting Poland and NATO allies to scramble Polish F-16s and Dutch F-35s, backed by German Patriot batteries and Italian surveillance aircraft, and shoot several of them down.
It marked the first time NATO forces had engaged aerial threats within Alliance airspace since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, prompting Poland to invoke NATO's Article 4 consultation mechanism and PM Donald Tusk to call it the closest Poland has come to open conflict since World War II, even as he added there was no reason to think war was imminent.
No one was killed, but debris — including from a NATO interceptor missile — damaged a house in the village of Wyryki, and that incident later became a domestic controversy of its own, with accusations that Tusk's government tried to obscure the fact the damage came from a Polish-fired missile rather than the drone itself.
Moscow denied targeting Poland and claimed its drones lacked the range to reach Polish territory, a claim Western officials and independent debris analysis largely dismissed, and the episode triggered NATO's "Eastern Sentry" reinforcement mission along the alliance's eastern flank as well as broader alarm across European capitals about Russia testing NATO's red lines.
The Ministry of National Defense has therefore announced an accelerated program to develop an integrated counter-drone system. Known as San, the system is intended to defend against unmanned aerial threats. Its remit, however, goes beyond drones. Equipped with both artillery and missile components, it is also designed to engage hostile aircraft and helicopters.
The planned configuration also gives the system the capability to neutralize enemy personnel and lightly armored vehicles. In the long term, it is expected to become one of the core elements of the Eastern Shield, Poland's comprehensive program to strengthen security along its eastern border.
“This is a system designed to protect the entire border, not just our own forces. Its mobility allows it to be deployed rapidly to the areas facing the greatest threat. The system is also modular. Additional batteries can be added, along with new types of military equipment,” says Cezary Tomczyk, Deputy Minister of National Defense responsible for developing the Eastern Shield.
But let us return to drones. As XYZ reported during the September attack, a real strike could have inflicted far greater damage. The drones' potential flight path passed close to energy and fuel infrastructure. An attack on those facilities would have had much more serious consequences.
Counter-drone systems are meant to protect more than the military
National security extends beyond the armed forces and military assets. It also encompasses thousands of civilian sites, including hospitals, major industrial facilities, transport corridors and infrastructure, and ports.
In practice, Poland's ports remain largely unprotected against drone attacks. In the context of hybrid warfare – where a "stray" drone or an act of sabotage can disrupt railway operations, manufacturing plants or port facilities – the threat is no longer local. It becomes a matter of national security, with direct implications for the safety of the state and its citizens.
Poland is home to thousands of industrial facilities that not only provide employment but also manufacture goods essential to the economy and national security. They range from the country's largest state-controlled groups, such as Orlen (fuel and energy – ed.), PGNiG (mining – ed.) and KGHM (copper mining – ed.), to smaller but equally important enterprises. Many of them fall under the supervision of Poland's Ministry of State Assets.
So how well are these state-owned industrial plants and factories protected? What measures have been taken to strengthen their security? To answer these questions, we approached the Ministry of State Assets.
Work is underway – but largely at the conceptual stage
According to the Ministry of State Assets (MAP), the ministry is working with operators of critical infrastructure that fall within its remit under Poland’s National Critical Infrastructure Protection Program. At the same time, it stresses that responsibility for protecting critical infrastructure rests primarily with the operators themselves.
“Representatives of the Ministry of State Assets have repeatedly participated in meetings organized by the Government Center for Security concerning threats posed by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and measures to counter them. These meetings reviewed the existing legal framework and put forward proposals and recommendations for amendments to the Aviation Law and the Electronic Communications Law. In 2025, the sectoral Critical Infrastructure Protection Forum organized by the Ministry of State Assets focused on the detection and neutralization of UAVs, as well as unmanned surface and underwater vehicles. The forum discussed methods of countering UAVs and identified practical challenges associated with deploying and operating counter-drone systems,” the ministry said in its response.
“Recommendations are being communicated”
Theory is one thing. We therefore asked the Ministry of State Assets whether it had developed and circulated guidance to the state-owned enterprises and companies under its supervision on how to protect their infrastructure.
The ministry replied that, as part of its statutory responsibilities, it “works on an ongoing basis with critical infrastructure protection officers on matters relating to the security of critical infrastructure facilities, installations and equipment, including counter-drone solutions. Relevant recommendations are communicated during meetings, videoconferences and through the Critical Infrastructure Protection Forum organized by the Ministry of State Assets.”
That is an important declaration. However, the ministry's response did not clarify whether it has issued a standardized set of written guidelines for the companies under its supervision, nor did it explain how compliance with those recommendations is monitored or verified.
“An improvement has been identified”
According to the Ministry of State Assets, based on analyses conducted every six months, the situation had improved by the end of January 2026 compared with September 2025.
The ministry says that critical infrastructure operators are expanding existing systems by adding new facilities and enhancing their capabilities to detect and neutralize UAVs. Some operators are conducting market assessments and signing preliminary agreements with suppliers, while others are testing counter-drone solutions at their sites. Beyond those broad statements, however, the ministry provided few concrete details.
“Most operators have already established no-fly zones over critical infrastructure facilities. Some critical infrastructure operators are also updating their procedures to include security protocols for incidents involving the crash of unauthorized UAVs and are developing recommendations for company management on the implementation of passive counter-drone protection measures,” the ministry said.
Selection of systems remains within the remit of company management
The ministry also stresses that commercially available counter-drone solutions are primarily designed to detect civilian UAVs. As a result, the key challenge remains securing critical infrastructure against military-grade drones.
In response to more detailed questions, the Ministry of State Assets declined to provide information, citing state secrecy and business confidentiality. It also did not answer how many normative documents have been issued in this area, nor did it disclose how many state-controlled companies under its supervision currently operate fully deployed and certified counter-drone systems. According to the ministry, the selection of such systems lies entirely with the management boards of individual companies.
The ministry further notes that counter-drone systems must be tailored to specific locations and their geographic conditions. As a result, in many cases it is not possible to recommend a single, standardized solution.
PGZ under special scrutiny?
Particular attention should be paid to Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa and its numerous subsidiaries.
Explainer
PGZ
Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ) is a capital group concentrating several dozen production plants, service facilities and research centers crucial for the Polish defence industry.
PGZ manufactures innovative systems and solutions used by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland and allied formations.
The Group’s offer: modern radiolopation and radar systems, rifles and optoelectronics, wheeled armoured transporters, barrel artillery, unmanned air systems and systems supporting battlefield management.
PGZ products are based on the Polish technological inventions and cooperation with global leaders in the defence sector. They are developed and produced under the supervision of experienced engineers, constructors and specialists.
Companies such as Rosomak in Siemianowice Śląskie or Huta Stalowa Wola manufacture equipment directly for the Polish Armed Forces. Meanwhile, Bydgoszcz-based NITRO-CHEM supplies TNT to multiple NATO countries.
It was over NITRO-CHEM that a drone operated by journalist Tomasz Sekielski flew last year. The incident demonstrated that, in practice, the protection of industrial facilities and their airspace remains largely theoretical. The same applied to other companies, as Sekielski also flew drones over additional plants supervised by the Ministry of State Assets.
Has anything changed at NITRO-CHEM since October? One person familiar with the internal workings of the Bydgoszcz facility responds with disarming bluntness: “Nothing. Everything is exactly as it was.”
“A team has been established…”
We therefore asked how counter-drone protection is organized within Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa. Our sources indicate that in recent years, no tenders for counter-drone systems have been conducted within the group’s companies. This may indirectly corroborate the Ministry of State Assets’ statement that, “as part of ongoing cooperation in 2025, the Ministry provided PGZ with a list of 14 entities offering counter-drone solutions tested by critical infrastructure operators.”
According to the ministry’s response, “PGZ is undertaking measures aimed at increasing the level of airspace security over key facilities belonging to companies within the capital group.”
As stated, the company has established a counter-drone systems team. It includes representatives of PGZ’s Security Office, as well as staff from group companies involved in analyzing and testing available technical solutions. However, according to one of XYZ’s sources, there is no formal directive defining the team’s composition or responsibilities, and the team itself has not met even once.
“Classified information”
We therefore asked Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa how counter-drone protection is organized across the group. In particular, we requested clarification on whether any subsidiary has implemented a coherent, operational and certified counter-drone protection system.
“All information concerning security systems protecting infrastructure within the PGZ Capital Group constitutes sensitive information, is a company secret and is therefore not disclosed to the public. Moreover, for entities within PGZ S.A. that are undertaking investments in key sectors related to national defense and public security, a range of measures has been implemented, including the establishment of protection zones and designation of restricted areas,” the company stated.
That said, declaring restricted zones is primarily an administrative tool within the domestic legal order. It is difficult to expect that, in the event of a potential conflict, a potential adversary would observe “restricted areas.”
Key Takeaways
- The Ministry of National Defense is developing a counter-drone system codenamed “San” as part of the Eastern Shield program. The initiative was triggered by incidents involving drones breaching Polish airspace, which were intercepted using highly expensive air-to-air missiles. The “San” system is designed not only to counter unmanned aerial vehicles, but also to engage aircraft, helicopters, and light ground targets. Thanks to its mobile and modular architecture, it will be deployable and scalable, allowing it to be repositioned to areas of greatest threat.
- Protection of critical infrastructure against drones remains insufficient. The Ministry of State Assets is primarily engaged in conceptual work, organizing meetings, and issuing recommendations to critical infrastructure operators. However, there is a lack of unified guidelines and limited transparency regarding the effective implementation of protective measures. Some operators are developing detection and neutralization systems and introducing security procedures, but the concrete outcomes of these efforts remain largely undisclosed.
- Strategic facilities continue to raise concerns regarding counter-drone protection. Particular questions surround companies within the Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa as well as other key industrial assets. Despite official statements about ongoing analyses and the establishment of a counter-drone systems team, there is no evidence of fully implemented, certified, and comprehensive solutions. Most information in this area remains classified or withheld by the companies themselves.