A sanctions case that shook Polish fintech: The downfall of Quicko and Fenige

First, Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW) accused Quicko of violating sanctions. Then the Financial Supervision Authority (KNF) revoked the licences of both Quicko and its sister company Fenige as national payment institutions.

Krzysztof Drzyzga, co-founder of both fintechs, insists they have no ties to Russia and argues that the penalty is disproportionate to the alleged offence. Here is the inside story of the case that led to the closure of profitable companies generating hundreds of millions of złoty in revenue.

Quicko lost its authorisation to operate as a national payment institution in January 2026, followed by Fenige in June 2026, following decisions by the KNF. In practice, the decisions mean the companies are banned from continuing their operations.

The two events were separated by Quicko being placed on Poland’s sanctions list. The decision by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration (MSWiA) was made following a request from the ABW.

KNF effectively shuts down Fenige and Quicko

The decision issued by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration (MSWiA) on May 21, 2026, cites, among other things, partially classified findings by Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW). It alleges that Quicko was used to facilitate the laundering of money transfers from Russia into the European Union, in breach of the international sanctions imposed on Russia.

As first reported in January 2026 by Andry Lebedev, director of Estonia-based Swipelux, Quicko was allegedly used as a bridge for laundering funds by Russian entities using a sanctioned stablecoin.

A few days after Lebedev’s revelations, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF) revoked Quicko’s authorization.

Quicko and Fenige were stars of Poland’s fintech sector

Both Quicko and Fenige were among the standout companies in Poland’s advanced financial technology services sector in recent years.

The two companies provided transaction processing and electronic payment services. Fenige specialized in online payment processing. Quicko initially focused on electronic devices enabling contactless payments before later developing the Quicko Wallet platform for sending and receiving payments. Quicko also offered customers services such as issuing Mastercard cards.

Both companies recorded rapid growth in revenues and profits in recent years:

• Quicko reported PLN 65.17 million (EUR 15.1 million) in revenue and PLN 9.24 million (EUR 2.1 million) in net profit in 2024. In 2023, the company’s revenue amounted to PLN 13.64 million (EUR 3.2 million), with a profit of PLN 612,000 (EUR 142,000). In 2022, revenue stood at PLN 2.56 million (EUR 592,000), while the company recorded a PLN 1.43 million (EUR 331,000) loss. In 2021, Quicko generated PLN 1.71 million (EUR 396,000) in revenue and reported a PLN 700,000 (EUR 162,000) loss.
• Fenige reported PLN 224.09 million (EUR 51.9 million) in net revenue and PLN 43.67 million (EUR 10.1 million) in net profit in 2025. In 2024, the figures were PLN 74.23 million (EUR 17.2 million) in net revenue and PLN 12.68 million (EUR 2.9 million) in profit. In 2023, Fenige recorded PLN 60 million (EUR 13.9 million) in revenue and PLN 9.79 million (EUR 2.3 million) in profit. In 2022, the company generated PLN 56.35 million (EUR 13.1 million) in revenue but reported a PLN 2.98 million (EUR 690,000) loss. In 2021, Fenige posted PLN 33.72 million (EUR 7.8 million) in revenue and a PLN 1.17 million (EUR 271,000) loss.

Fenige was among the winners of the Cashless.pl Fintech Project 2025 award. Both Fenige and Quicko had also received distinctions in the same competition in previous years.

Fenige and Quicko were closely connected companies, linked among others through Krzysztof Drzyzga and the WP2 Investments fund.

The fintech ecosystem is linked by, among others, Krzysztof Drzyzga

The ownership structures and management teams of both companies include figures well known in Polish business, with extensive professional experience. Krzysztof Drzyzga himself spent many years working at Mastercard.

We had the opportunity to speak with him just a few days after the KNF decision concerning Fenige, under which the company had its authorization revoked at the end of June. The company is required to cease providing payment services and is no longer allowed to enter into new agreements. By September 30, it must terminate the legal relationships arising from contracts with customers and business partners. No later than the end of September, Fenige must also enable customers to withdraw their funds or transfer them to accounts held with other payment service providers.

Quicko is appealing the decisions issued by Polish authorities. Fenige intends to take a similar approach. Further possible steps include challenging the decisions before the Voivodeship Administrative Court and, potentially, filing appeals with higher courts.

In an interview with XYZ, Krzysztof Drzyzga addressed the publicly available allegations, primarily those contained in the sanctions decision against Quicko.

Drzyzga blames Ukrainian competitors

Grzegorz Nawacki, Mateusz Lubiński, XYZ: Let’s start with the obvious question: the KNF and ABW accuse companies linked to you of being used to transfer funds from Russia. After being legitimized within the EU, these funds could then have been used for various purposes. Are they right?

Krzysztof Drzyzga: No, they are not.

So where did these allegations come from?

Probably from Ukraine, because in 2024 and early 2025 our Ukrainian competitor reported Quicko to the local regulator. The reason was the effectiveness of our partners in acquiring customers of Ukrainian origin – immigrants coming to the European Union. This triggered actions against Quicko and led to further allegations. We know that this competitor publicly celebrated the fact that it had contributed to Quicko losing its license.

But perhaps we should tell the whole story from the beginning.

An unusual inspection involving the review of emails

We’re listening.

My problems, and Quicko’s problems, began around May or June 2025, when the Polish Financial Supervision Authority’s Office (UKNF – the Office of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority – ed.) carried out an inspection at Quicko. It was a fairly standard inspection, at least that is how it appeared. What was unusual, however, was that emails were seized. The authorities requested correspondence from members of the management board covering the previous three years.

Perhaps I should add, before we get to the heart of the matter, that for the past 15 years I and my colleagues have been developing a group of fintech companies – essentially, fully Polish companies.

We financed the development largely ourselves. European funds provided some support, and there was also backing from business angels as well as private equity and venture capital funds. Everything was progressing extremely well. We built an advanced technology ecosystem that enabled financial operations at the highest level.

400 B2B partners, including more than 50 banks

We sold these solutions internationally, and we are now present on five continents.

The entire group of companies also had 400 B2B partners, including more than 50 banks, to which we provided payment card tokenization systems, for example for enabling Apple Pay and Google Pay, as well as other card-related solutions. Our partners also included, among others, Mastercard and China’s Huawei, whose watches can be used for payments thanks to our Polish technologies.

We are as far removed as possible from being some kind of obscure Russian shell company or from having any transactions with Russia. For many years, our business strategy was not focused on cooperation with Russian customers. Quite the opposite – we had a significant number of partners and customers from Ukraine, which is probably the original source of our problems.

Quicko initially started out with electronic payment gadgets. At some point, several years ago, both Quicko and Fenige obtained licences as national payment institutions in order to expand into payment services – an area where we had already been developing technologies for banks.

The companies underwent all required inspections. They often ended with standard recommendations, which we implemented. This continued until the Quicko case, which began in June 2025.

The Russian Quicko company that no one knew about

In the management board emails I mentioned earlier, inspectors came across information that there was a Russian company called Quicko, in which the Polish Quicko held a 90% stake. However, it is likely that our authorities had previously received information from the Ukrainian side, and that this prompted them to launch the inspection at Quicko.

So where did this Russian company come from?

As I mentioned, Quicko started out with gadgets. A Russian national whom I knew from my time working at Mastercard (Krzysztof Drzyzga does not want to disclose his name; however, it appears, among other places, in the MSWiA sanctions decision — ed.) began helping me sell them in Russia. This was around 2012, 2013 or 2014, but definitely before Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its takeover of Donbas, when everyone was still doing business with Russia.

In reality, only small quantities of our products were sold in Russia, and the company effectively had just one employee.

However, I do not dispute the allegation that Quicko was the majority shareholder in the Russian company.

Financial companies are required to promptly inform the relevant authorities about such links…

Yes, but we were supposed to have sold that company back in 2017. I have an agreement – although it is not notarized – stating that it was sold. The reality, however, is that it was never actually transferred. We were deceived by the person who was supposed to complete the transaction. So, although the company had not conducted any business since 2017, it was never removed from the Russian business register and somehow ended up being forgotten by us.

Information about this company appeared in the emails reviewed by the UKNF because we ourselves had identified the issue earlier – several months before June 2025. We immediately began shutting it down, so to speak, as quickly as possible. Today, it is in the final stages of liquidation.

So you were closing down your Russian company for nine years? Including four years during which sanctions against Russia’s financial system were already in force? Why did it take so long?

Not for nine years, but for one year, because we only found out that it still existed at the end of 2024. The process of liquidating a company with Polish capital in Russia is, for geopolitical reasons, simply a nightmare. You have to obtain approval from some kind of subcommittee in Russia, then from a commission, followed by ministries, and prepare the necessary documents. As a Polish citizen, I can practically not travel to Russia to handle this myself.

It should be added that this company had done nothing since 2017. Absolutely nothing.

Poland’s sanctions law sets strict requirements

OK, but given how the legal environment works – and the fact that any connection to Russian companies can create sanctions risks – was it really impossible to close that Russian company earlier?

We were doing it as quickly as we could. Unfortunately, the process dragged on. We probably could have acted faster if the management board had considered it a matter of critical importance. Because, contrary to appearances, there are many companies that have operations or subsidiaries in Russia. You can find banks that still conduct banking activities there today and have subsidiaries there. The issue may have appeared less significant because the company’s existence did not constitute an activity prohibited under sanctions regulations.

We probably could have done more. It is always easier to judge these things in hindsight. But this was a company that was not doing anything. We had many other matters on our plates, numerous companies, a rapidly growing parent company and group, as well as projects and clients that at the time appeared to the management board to be more important than this issue. We were handling many different activities at the same time.

The Russian national and his associate, who was difficult to locate

The KNF notes that the company was inactive, but the Russian national you worked with was involved in the structures of Polish companies…

This Russian national left Russia because he did not agree with the situation there after the annexation of Crimea. He has lived in Poland for almost 10 years because he opposes Putin’s policies. He has children who speak Polish and attend Polish schools, and he himself is seeking Polish citizenship.

He was, in fact, one of our shareholders in Quicko and a member of the management board – all with KNF approval. However, he has not held these roles since the KNF adopted Resolution No. 111 in 2022, which informed the market that concentrating business activities in Russia or cooperating with Russian partners would be viewed unfavorably by the UKNF.

In 2022, Quicko also held a meeting with the UKNF regarding his role. The discussion covered the position he would hold within the company. The UKNF certainly did not say “no.” It had been aware of him for three years.

This Russian national was in Poland completely legally. He is currently at the final stage of the citizenship application process and is awaiting a decision from the president. He has been and remains vetted by the authorities.

After all, Russian nationals work legally in virtually every Polish bank and insurance company. This includes PKO BP as well.

Another issue was that the Russian company had another shareholder. In our Russian company, we held 90% of the shares; he held not even 10%. There was also another person connected to him – his associate – who owned part of those remaining 10%.

This was also one of the reasons behind the problems, because in order to close the company, we had to locate this associate of our Russian partner, and we had lost contact with him seven years earlier. You cannot shut down a company while owning only 90% of it. You also need the remaining 10%.

To sum up: the Russian company gradually became inactive and eventually ceased operations altogether. It sold electronic gadgets, a business activity that we completely abandoned at some point in 2016. In any case, I do not believe this fact was decisive for the KNF’s decision.

Various crypto-sector clients suspected of links to Russia

In addition to the employee mentioned earlier, there are also cryptocurrency exchanges allegedly linked to Russia…

These are simply various clients of ours. None of them had any links to Russia. All of the companies mentioned in the proceedings were registered in Europe, operated in Europe, and had no users from Russia.

It is worth emphasizing that there were only a small number of these clients identified by the UKNF. Quicko had 440,000 users and more than 100 business partners – and even more large B2B partners. The allegations concern only three of them.

When we look at our databases, it turns out that people of Russian nationality account for approximately 0.11% of our users, and all of them were residents of the European Union.

There were no transactions involving Russia and Poland or Europe, in either direction, or transactions conducted exclusively within Russia. Absolutely zero. (Such transactions are almost entirely prevented by sanctions — ed.)

By contrast, Ukrainians account for more than 25% of our users, which, as I mentioned earlier, is what triggered the attack against us.

Krzysztof Drzyzga: transactions were made by Poles, Ukrainians and EU citizens

How much revenue did these companies generate for you?

When it comes to direct activities performed for these companies, I would say it accounted for less than 5–10% of transactions. However, the transactions conducted through our platform were made by their users, who are Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, European and other citizens. We provide services for those users, not for the partner itself.

All of these transactions took place in Europe, using Mastercard systems or similar infrastructure. It is worth adding that every payment transaction involved at least two banks registered in Europe, Mastercard, a card processor and Quicko. There was no possibility for a transaction from Russia, to Russia, or within Russia to slip through such a transaction flow. Technically, it was impossible. It should also be noted that no transaction was settled in cryptocurrencies.

So how does the service you provide actually work?

Let’s start with the fact that every partner is registered with the UKNF – Quicko notifies the regulator of its intention to sign an agreement. This is important because the UKNF had known our partners for many years and had not raised any objections regarding them.

Users of these partners, including cryptocurrency exchanges, could convert their cryptocurrencies into fiat currencies (such as euros or złoty — ed.). But they did so exclusively on those exchanges, and they could only transfer fiat currency to us. We then received a bank transfer sent by a bank cooperating with the exchange, which was accepted by a bank cooperating with Quicko. We never physically handled cryptocurrencies ourselves.

Furthermore, the entities mentioned as suspicious operate in EU countries under licences issued by the respective countries in which they operate.

For example, a Polish user has the right to use a Quicko card while using the Trustee cryptocurrency platform. We do not operate on behalf of Trustee – we operate on behalf of that user. It is the user for whom we open an account.

We also selected the most transparent customer verification procedure and submitted an inquiry to the KNF regarding each case.

In fact, one of the allegations included in the decision mentions koshelek.ru, with which we had no relationship whatsoever. We do not know such a company. The only allegation against us is that koshelek.ru placed a link to Quicko on its website.

ABW views Quicko’s revenue growth as suspicious

The ABW’s findings note that after 2022 you started growing for some reason. There appears to be a suggestion that such rapid growth could have come from an illegal source.

Yes, it is a great allegation – except that it is completely off the mark. I admit it: we had payment systems ready in 2022, and we responded to a market need. Millions of Ukrainians arrived in the European Union and wanted to transfer their money here. We owe this growth to those who found refuge in Europe and Poland – not to some mysterious transfers from Russia.

In situations of crisis, people often also place their money in cryptocurrencies. I personally believe that it is worth keeping part of your funds in crypto, preferably in so-called stablecoins, as a safety buffer for difficult times. There is nothing particularly unusual about that.

We suspect that this may have also created tensions in Ukraine, where there may have been an interest in encouraging Ukrainians to use Ukrainian solutions instead. This could have triggered attacks by local competitors and, subsequently, by authorities against our partners and against Quicko. We may therefore also have become a target of attacks from that side.

There were also arguments related to customer risk – specifically, the risk that clients could lose their money.

These arguments were added essentially at the last minute. Quicko disproved this allegation a few months later, as by May 1 it had settled accounts with more than 95% of its customers. The remaining cases involved people who simply did not contact us. There was no scandal associated with this, and there still is not one today.

Of course, when Quicko’s accounts were blocked in May following the sanctions decision, we were no longer able to carry out any operations, including paying salaries. As a result, Quicko is currently not settling accounts and has no way to do so.

Fenige linked to Quicko

After Quicko, it was not long before Fenige came under scrutiny. From your perspective, what does this case look like?

In the case of Fenige, the pattern is even more interesting.

Quicko and Fenige were two separate businesses, with completely independent management boards. Fenige was a fully independent company. In fact, the only allegations being made against it concern personal links to Quicko (among others, Krzysztof Drzyzga previously held management positions at Fenige and has capital ties to the company – editor’s note).

Fenige was an independent payment institution, formally operating in compliance with the law and, in fact, significantly stronger than Quicko. In 2025, Fenige generated well over PLN 200 million (approximately EUR 46 million) in revenue and employed 140 people, while Quicko generated around PLN 10 million (approximately EUR 2.3 million) and employed 40 people.

Both companies were highly profitable. Today, they effectively no longer exist. That is the situation, and it can be stated plainly.

A riskier business with higher returns

How did you manage to achieve such a high profit-to-revenue ratio? Fenige reported more than PLN 50 million (approximately EUR 11.5 million) in operating profit in 2025, while Quicko generated PLN 6 million (approximately EUR 1.4 million). What is the specific nature of this business model?

It depends on the company, but the general answer is very simple: for 15 years, we had been investing in technology. We built it in cooperation with banks, Mastercard and other partners, which helped us develop our systems. What does that mean in practice? Once these systems are built, there are no further variable costs – intermediaries disappear. Each transaction becomes practically free for you.

In that respect, these were exceptional companies. In my view, there are no other Polish companies in Poland that could operate in the payments market without intermediaries.

So you managed to create an advanced financial technology solution. That seems worth emphasizing.

Yes, absolutely. That was our distinguishing feature. The second reason was that we operated in businesses with a higher risk profile – specifically as intermediaries between the crypto world and the mainstream financial sector, where traditional banks and other large payment institutions do not operate. The margins in such a business are also higher.

Krzysztof Drzyzga: Quicko and Fenige had no involvement with cryptocurrencies

Let’s return to the issue of links with cryptocurrency exchanges…

Let me emphasize this once again: Quicko and Fenige themselves had absolutely nothing to do with cryptocurrencies. We offered our partners the option for their customers – once they had converted crypto assets into traditional currency through those platforms – to obtain a payment card from us.

It is also worth noting that the crypto world leaves quite a lot of traces, and a great deal can be verified. We carried out such verification ourselves as well.

When you look into the details, you can determine where the money was actually coming from. In our case, there was no, let’s call it, Russian-related activity. Or there was extremely little of it. It was at a completely standard level.

We have the impression that in this world, particularly in countries east of our border, where, for example, the distinction between being Ukrainian and being Russian can in many cases be quite fluid – someone may speak Russian but be Ukrainian – it can be difficult to determine whether a given entity is suspicious or not. Do you rule out the possibility that someone used the tools you created and carried out transfers – so to speak – below the threshold of detection by your monitoring systems?

I rule out the possibility that such cases occurred more frequently than at any other large payment institution.

There were some cases, including one specific instance where someone may have exploited the system. But let’s look at the details. What matters is how Quicko responded. Once Quicko became aware of the situation, it immediately terminated the agreement with that partner.

In any case, we are talking about hundreds or, at most, a few thousand cards and transactions – a fraction of our overall operations.

Krzysztof Drzyzga criticizes the KNF: “We were not asked a single question”

So, in short: you believe you have little to reproach yourselves for. But what about your relationship with the KNF’s supervisory office (UKNF)? How did that process look?

There was no relationship, no questions and no meetings with the UKNF.

The last questions we received regarding Quicko were in July 2025. Since then, up to today, we have not been asked a single question. During that time, we sent the regulator several thousand pages of explanations.

In the case of Fenige, no questions were asked at all. Interestingly, on Wednesday, June 24, 2026 – one day before the decision to revoke the license – a meeting took place, just two days before the authorization was withdrawn. It was the first meeting since May or June 2025.

I do not understand how such decisions can be made without a thorough review of transactions, an examination of systems and a proper understanding of the company’s explanations. The entire reasoning is based on information available online – information that can easily be manipulated.

And what is discussed at such a meeting?

I cannot provide specific details. However, we presented our history – essentially what you are hearing here. We have nothing to hide.

There are western banks that have not closed their Russian operations

Did Mastercard and Visa continue working with you until the end?

Yes. The payment organizations supported us. It is also worth adding that every one of these partners was reported not only to the UKNF, but also to Mastercard. Every person mentioned by the Polish authorities was disclosed to Mastercard.

Given your extensive experience in this sector: if you were a Russian national looking for “alternative” money-laundering solutions, what would you do? Would you use Quicko’s solutions?

Certainly not, because I would not use a card with low transaction limits, and Quicko did not offer high limits. In my opinion, it is not a tool for money laundering. At most, I could use it to pay for Netflix or buy a hamburger at McDonald’s. That is what it was designed for.

It is also worth examining whether any sanctions were actually breached and, if so, which specific sanctions. Let me remind you that there are banks that transfer millions of euros from Russia to Europe and back. Such activity is not covered by sanctions.

Sanctions apply to specific banks operating in Russia, but there are also many banks that are not subject to them. They apply to designated individuals, designated companies, and certain sectors. Our systems contain no transactions of this kind.

Standard financial operations involving Russia are not subject to sanctions – otherwise, large European banking groups would not be able to operate there.

KNF and MSWiA decisions mean the end of operations for Quicko and Fenige

What are you losing as a result of the KNF and MSWiA decisions?

We are losing everything. Almost nothing can be saved. It is therefore understandable that I would like to have the sense that this process was conducted properly and that the punishment is proportionate to the alleged wrongdoing.

We do not know where we failed or which specific transactions are at issue. I would like to emphasize once again that every one of these partners was reported to the UKNF and approved several years earlier.

How is it possible that such decisions are made without identifying specific transactions? Shouldn’t the authorities look for users from Russia or other facts indicating a breach of sanctions?

The result is that around 200 people – Poles – have lost their jobs or are losing them now. The invested capital amounts to around PLN 100 million (approximately EUR 23 million) over 10–15 years, and it is being wasted. The technologies created by these companies are essentially disappearing. Will they ever be possible to recreate? It would be extremely difficult.

A group that was valued at between PLN 1 billion and PLN 2 billion (approximately EUR 230 million–460 million) and that was likely preparing for a stock market debut is now ceasing to exist.

Quicko’s accounts have already been frozen, meaning we cannot even pay employee salaries. Even if a court rules in several months or a year that operations should be restored, there may be nothing left to restore.

If we look for similar cases elsewhere in Europe – cases where licenses were revoked at such an advanced stage of a company’s development – in my view, there simply are none.

There are, of course, difficult cases, for example in Lithuania. But those companies are still operating – regulators have not shut them down. Sometimes on a reduced scale, but they continue to operate.

Key Takeaways

1. The KNF operates under a restrictive act adopted in April 2022. The legislator’s intention was to make it more difficult for any entities that could, in any way, be used to support Russia’s genocidal invasion of Ukraine to operate. The revocation of Quicko and Fenige’s licenses is explained by an assessment of overall risk: personal links, the existence of an undisclosed Russian subsidiary, and cooperation with entities from the cryptocurrency market. Some of the ABW’s findings have been classified.
2. For the regulator, the mere possibility that financial infrastructure could be used to circumvent sanctions may be sufficient grounds for taking the most far-reaching measures. In this case, that means the effective winding down of two sizeable companies: the loss of around 200 jobs and the freezing of technologies developed over many years. Regardless of the assessment of whether the KNF’s decision was justified, the case demonstrates that in the financial sector, regulatory and reputational risks can bring down even rapidly growing companies that have already reached significant scale.
3. Krzysztof Drzyzga, a co-creator of Quicko and Fenige’s success, argues that the companies did not process Russian transfers and primarily served customers from the EU and Ukraine. In his view, the allegations are based on a misinterpretation of cooperation with crypto-sector entities and on constructing a narrative around Russian links that were either negligible or did not exist at all. The final resolution of the dispute will most likely come only before administrative courts.