A Russian missile exposes gaps in Poland's warning system (INTERVIEW)

Łukasz Grzesiczak, XYZ: Did the Polish authorities respond appropriately to the unidentified object entering the country's airspace?

Przemysław Mazur, PhD, DSc, Professor at UKEN: Most likely, this was an accidental incursion involving a Kh-101 cruise missile. It is a long-range cruise missile with an operational range of around 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles) that is only rarely seen operating so close to Poland's border.

Its defining characteristic is that, as a cruise missile, it can alter its flight path throughout its mission. It may follow one trajectory and then abruptly change course. Another feature is its relatively small radar cross-section. It is not a so-called "stealth" missile, but its radar signature is reduced, making it comparatively difficult for radar systems to detect. It is also capable of flying at very low altitudes, where radar coverage becomes significantly less effective.

A tactic commonly employed by Russia is to send such missiles toward Poland before they turn back and strike targets such as Lviv from the west—a direction that is less heavily defended. That also makes it more difficult to determine the missile's intended destination while it is still in flight.

Was this deliberate on Russia's part?

Most likely not. The missile's flight path was probably the result of Ukrainian defensive action or a malfunction in its guidance or control system. These missiles are generally highly accurate—some estimates put their accuracy at within 10 meters (33 feet) of the intended target. It is therefore highly unlikely that an open field near Lublin was the intended destination.

The second issue concerns Poland's radar network and air-defense system. It remains unclear how well integrated the system actually is. Military experts have offered differing assessments, with some arguing that its various components are not fully interoperable.

An effective air-defense architecture consists of several layers that together provide a comprehensive operational picture. Unfortunately, Poland has relatively few radar stations close to its eastern border capable of detecting low-flying missiles—precisely the type of sensors needed in incidents like this. Apart from AWACS airborne early-warning aircraft, which are typically provided by the United States or NATO, such radar installations are the primary means of detecting these threats and determining their flight paths.

Should the missile have been shot down?

Was intercepting it technically possible?

According to the authorities' official account, the missile was being tracked and the armed forces were prepared to shoot it down. Officials said that a pair of fighter aircraft had been scrambled, suggesting that the missile was under at least some degree of surveillance.

At the same time, it ultimately came down just 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) from residential buildings. That raises questions. Ideally, a cruise missile should not be allowed to fly so close to populated areas during the final phase of its flight before impact. For that reason, I have some doubts as to whether the missile remained under effective monitoring during the last stage of its trajectory.

I do not know whether the Ukrainian authorities formally warned Poland in advance that such a missile was heading in our direction. I suspect they did, as that has been their practice in the past.

From a technical standpoint, intercepting the missile was entirely feasible. The F-16 fighter jets deployed in response are capable of carrying out such a mission. An even more effective option would have been the Patriot air-defense system equipped with PAC-3 MSE interceptors. However, Poland does not have full coverage with that system, limiting its operational reach. There have also been reports that some of its interceptors were transferred to Ukraine, although I cannot assess to what extent the system remains fully operational in Poland today.

The warning system failed

Residents of Lublin and several other counties in the Lubelskie region—including Krasnystaw and Biłgoraj—heard air-raid sirens warning of an aerial threat. The sirens appear not to have been accompanied by any additional information. Is that standard procedure?

No. That is not how the system is supposed to work.

The decision to activate the sirens itself was consistent with established procedures. The Government Security Center (RCB) advises people who hear warning sirens to immediately check other official communication channels for further information. As far as I am aware, however, no such information was available through any of them.

During the night, the Operational Command of the Polish Armed Forces announced that a pair of fighter aircraft had been scrambled. That is a routine operational update, intended to explain why military aircraft may be heard overhead or why civilian flights could experience delays. But it did not provide the public with the information the RCB advises people to seek after hearing the sirens. In that respect, the warning system did not function as intended.

Looking at the locations where the sirens were activated also raises questions. Lublin was probably included without sufficient justification. Admittedly, as I mentioned earlier, we were dealing with a cruise missile capable of changing course during flight. Even so, it is striking that sirens were not activated in some of the towns over which the missile actually passed. There, the warning would have been far more justified. This suggests that the system did not work entirely as it should have.

Why were no RCB emergency text alerts sent?

It would seem reasonable for the activation of the sirens to have been accompanied by an RCB emergency text alert. After all, such messages are routinely sent for far less serious events, such as heavy snowfall warnings in winter.

First, however, we should ask whether SMS technology is still the right tool to rely on in the mid-2020s.

Second, anyone can conduct a simple experiment by comparing when RCB alerts arrive on different phones in the same household. Delivery times can vary by several hours—even between smartphones connected to the same mobile network.

That illustrates the fundamental problem. SMS is simply not suitable for real-time emergency warning, or for situations where only a few minutes separate the alert from the threat itself. It is an outdated system.

In the case we are discussing, the time between the Operational Command identifying the object as a threat and its impact may have been measured in minutes. In such circumstances, we need tools that deliver warnings instantly, in real time—not after the event has already occurred.

Nor should such a system be managed exclusively from the center, as it is today. Decisions should be made at the provincial (voivodeship) level. The voivode and the regional crisis-management team are far better placed to assess local conditions and decide when to activate the warning system.

In this case, no RCB text alerts were sent at all.

Why not?

The explanation may lie in human decision-making. In principle, the procedure is straightforward: the Operational Command of the Polish Armed Forces notifies the Government Security Center (RCB). We know that this notification was made, so the military appears to have followed the established procedures. It is then the RCB that decides whether to issue an emergency alert.

Were there consultations? Was there a delay in the decision-making process? I do not know. Frankly, I hope details of that process do not become public, because they could expose weaknesses in the state's crisis-response system and reveal potential vulnerabilities.

Something appears to have gone wrong—either in communication between the Operational Command and the RCB or within the RCB itself. It is also possible, although we simply do not know, that there were technical limitations. Even if a decision to issue the alerts was made, it may have proved technically impossible to do so in the available time. I cannot say. Those are only my own speculations.

We are not prepared for similar incidents

What lessons should Poland draw from this incident?

Once again, we have shown that our response system is marked by confusion. Poland has a Civil Protection Act that, in theory, sets out the relevant procedures. In practice, however, it appears that we still do not know who is responsible for making key decisions or when those decisions should be taken. And this is happening while a full-scale war is being fought just across our border.

There is a clear disconnect between politicians' rhetoric—preparing the public for the possibility of war and emphasizing the responsibilities society must bear—and their actual efforts to strengthen the country's resilience to such threats.

We need shelters and designated places of refuge. The government has launched a program and some facilities are being built. But do we have an effective system that tells people where to go in an emergency? At home, most people have at least a rough idea. But what if they are on vacation or in an unfamiliar town? How are they supposed to know where to find shelter?

We should learn from Ukraine, whose capacity for improvisation and wartime innovation has been remarkable. Ukrainians rely on a range of mobile applications—many of them developed through grassroots initiatives—to warn the public about threats. One example is Tryvoha, which provides real-time air raid alerts and other emergency notifications.

How do the Ukrainians handle it?

I have had the opportunity to see how these applications work through Ukrainian colleagues. When an air raid alert is issued, a smartphone emits the same warning sound as the sirens. The screen also flashes. In other words, people receive real-time alerts directly through an app on their phones.

Poland is developing the mObywatel app, but it does not yet offer this kind of functionality. Israel has a similar system to Ukraine's. It is something Poland should have introduced long ago—if we truly believe, as our political leaders repeatedly say, that the country faces a heightened security threat and the possibility of armed conflict.

We may also need a more decentralized approach to public warnings. Decisions to activate sirens are made at the local level, and in this case they were activated. The decision to send emergency text alerts, however, is made centrally in Warsaw.

What last night's events showed is that we are not prepared—neither institutionally nor as a society. I wonder how many people, on hearing the sirens, actually took any action at all. Fortunately, there was no need to seek shelter on this occasion. But that itself highlights the problem: public awareness and preparedness remain insufficient.

Key takeaways

1. Przemysław Mazur, PhD, DSc, Professor at UKEN, believes the missile most likely entered Polish airspace accidentally, either as a result of Ukrainian defensive action or a malfunction in its guidance or control system. "These systems are generally highly accurate—some estimates put their accuracy at within 10 meters (33 feet) of the intended target. It is highly unlikely that an open field near Lublin was the missile's intended destination," he says.
2. In his view, Poland's public warning system failed. The Government Security Center (RCB) advises people who hear warning sirens to immediately seek further information through official public channels. Yet, as far as is known, no such information was available.
3. The expert is also critical of Poland's political leadership. "There is a clear disconnect between politicians' rhetoric—preparing the public for the possibility of war and emphasizing the responsibilities society must bear—and their actual efforts to strengthen the country's resilience to such threats. That applies to both the current government and its predecessor," says Przemysław Mazur, PhD, DSc, Professor at UKEN.